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This chapter presents the purpose, background information, research questions, 
scope, limitations, assumptions, methodology, and organization of the study. 
A. BACKGROUND  
A comprehensive, widely accepted definition of corruption does not 
currently exist in the literature. Different aspects of the problem are often 
highlighted in competing definitions depending on the objective of the 
investigation. Nevertheless, corruption can generally be described as the 
abuse of public power for private benefit. (Gupta et al., 2006). 
From bribes paid at military checkpoints to multi-million dollar 
procurement kickback schemes, corruption squanders scarce public 
resources, reducing the effectiveness of government spending, and 
impeding economic development. Policy-making and implementation 
efforts are distorted when officers or administrators abuse their access to 
state resources and privileges. At the highest levels of government, 
corruption can affect decisions on war and peace, and future policy that 
impacts society. When basic information about defense spending is kept 
secret, it can undermine public confidence in the state and the armed 
forces. In the worst cases, corrupt networks embedded in national and 
transnational economies can encourage and sustain violent conflict, 
leading to further economic degradation with negative impacts on human 
life and living conditions. In short, defense corruption can threaten 
national security. (Reiling, 2009) 
As mentioned above, corruption is a significant problem in the defense sector, and 
“allegations of corruption in this sector are neither infrequent nor unexpected” (G. 
D'Agostino, 2011). Arms deals are a global business and require special attention. The 
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that 50% of all bribery-related complaints relate 
to defense transfers (Transparency International, 2006). According to Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s data, total global military expenditures were 
around $1.62 Trillion in 2010 (SIPRI, 2011).  
In the same year, the total value of worldwide arms transfer agreements was 




Figure 1.   Regional Military Expenditures-2010 (From: SIPRI, 2011) 
Combined, the USA, Russia, Germany, China, France and the UK represented 
81% of major arms suppliers, and 60% of those arms were exported to developing 
countries. (SIPRI, 2011) (Figure 2)  
 
Figure 2.   Major Arm Supplier Countries-2010 (From: SIPRI, 2011) 
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The structure of defense procurement is characterized by large, technically 
complex contracts, with multiple layers of subcontractors, and procurement agents often 
hidden behind a shield of secrecy and security. Secrecy and national security are 
legitimate concerns for states, but they are also misused in oversimplified arguments to 
obstruct government/military transparency.(Pyman, Ethics and Corruption Relating to 
Arms Exports, 2005). 
According to Transparency International, the average procurement process 
typically involves around ten steps: government policy creation, capability gap definition, 
requirement definition and support, online project cost assessment, tender, bid 
assessment, contract award, delivery and in-service phases. Every stage of this process 
holds specific risks of corruption; however the tendering stage requires particular scrutiny 
because of vulnerabilities that arise from offset arrangements and single-source 
procurement methods. 
Tendering emerges as one of the steps in a procurement process that is highly 
vulnerable to corruption risks. Prospective bidders can be invited to submit bids with 
little or no advertising; excessive use of confidentiality can conceal corrupt actions and 
hamper oversight efforts; single source justifications could be strategically used to select 
a preferred vendor; and collusion among bidders can undermine competition resulting in 
higher prices and impacting other evaluation criteria. 
Strategic government investments in security can enhance economic growth.  
However, overly large military burdens and excessive government spending can reduce 
it, and overt corruption can compound these negative effects. Governments sometimes try 
to justify excessively large militaries by attaching benefits from offset agreements in 
costly arms deals. In theory, the economic burden of large arms purchases are offset by 
the seller (Matthews, Defense offsets: policy versus pragmatism, 2004). Offsets can take 
the form of assistance to create or support a defense industrial base, offer job 
opportunities, provide transfers of technology, and/or reduce barriers for a country to 
produce state-of-the art defense equipment.  
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However, in practice, the results are often far different. A lack of transparency, 
accountability, and integrity undermines many of the desired benefits of offsets; such 
cases often occur under the veil of secrecy, and with an unrealistic perspective of a 
country’s ability to absorb technology. Additionally, these agreements are especially 
vulnerable to corruption since they often lack adequate monitoring of performance, and 
they are conducted in an opaque and complex environment. The excessive discretionary 
power held by state procurement officials and bureaucrats in offset agreements can easily 
translate into personal gains, cronyism and nepotism, and encourages bribery as a tool for 
companies to gain a competitive advantage. 
Another significant corruption risk related to the tendering process is single-
source procurements. It is common knowledge that limited competition in defense 
procurements “leads to relatively high level of informal contracts and to rent-seeking 
activities, providing fertile ground for the growth of corrupt practices” (G. D'Agostino, 
2011).  The existence of sole source contracts is often justified by governments to 
preserve their national defense industrial bases and security interests (Regina Wilson, 
2006). Sole source contracts often lack the multiple levels of oversight found in 
competitive contracts. Although not intrinsically a proof of corruption, the non-
competitive structure and secrecy of single-source procurements makes the procurement 
process more vulnerable to corruption (Regina Wilson, 2006).  
The recognition of corruption’s subversive and detrimental economic and social 
effects dimensions forced states to seek both internal and international remedies. In order 
to relieve this burden, countries devised inward-looking strategies while also organizing 
numerous multilateral efforts to control transnational corruption. Some of the best known 
multilateral initiatives are the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In addition to 
these macro-level efforts, defense companies have developed a common set of principles 
called Common Industry Standards (CIS) to combat corruption. Moreover, NATO, 
working with the civilian anti-corruption organization Transparency International (TI), 
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recently launched a “Building Integrity Initiative” that includes an Integrity-self 
Assessment Questionnaires, a Compendium of Best Practices, and Training Modules 
specific to defense sector corruption for member and partner countries.  
Despite the existence of multiple domestic and international efforts, it is 
unrealistic to assert that global corruption is resolved. Every year, corruption scandals 
make headlines and draw public reaction. Similarly, defense procurement corruption is 
widespread and poses significant threats to the security and prosperity of countries 
around the globe. In this context, it is important to recognize that successful 
anticorruption strategies depend on an understanding of the underlying causes of 
corruption, and producing realistic and effective solutions. “Defining corruption is 
important because effective anticorruption or government integrity programs depend on 
establishing clear targets and standards (Anthony Lanyi, 2005). 
At this point, some shortcomings of current strategies are explored, and common 
gray areas in the tools that let corruption flourish are identified. This thesis examines the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in curbing corruption in defense procurement, 
with special focus on the tendering stage.  
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate corruption-related vulnerabilities, gaps, 
and problematic areas specific to the defense procurement cycle, as well as the measures, 
tools, and mechanisms that were devised and put into practice in order to curb and 
prevent corruption. This includes examining the steps of defense procurement, assessing 
which of these steps are most prone to corruption, and investigating the options and tools 
available to curb corruption in defense procurement—particularly in the case of sole 
source selection methods and offset arrangements. The effectiveness of current tools and 
measures will be discussed. Three cases from around the globe will be used to illustrate 





shortcomings of the current tools in the fight against corruption, and devise a set of 
questions to help detect and prevent corruption vulnerabilities related to offset 
arrangement and sole source selection. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What are the corruption related vulnerabilities that exist in the defense 
procurement cycle? 
 Which vulnerabilities pose higher risks in the defense procurement cycle? 
 What are the significant risks related with offset arrangements and sole-source 
procurement methods? 
 How effective are existing anti-corruption tools and strategies in the defense 
procurement cycle? 
 How do existing tools and measures impact corruption vulnerabilities in the 
defense procurement cycle? 
D. SCOPES, LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS 
This study focuses on specific phases of the defense procurement cycle, and their 
vulnerability to corruption.   
This study will examine corruption schemes initiated by both buyers and sellers; 
globally accepted anti-corruption-tools will also be a major focus.   
Corruption risks in the private sector will not be addressed, nor will any locally devised 
and implemented anti-corruption measures. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research methodology is limited to the literature review of sources related to 
defense procurement, corruption vulnerabilities, and the measures, tools, mechanisms 
and international conventions opposing corruption. Information regarding these 
t o o l s  an d  m ec h a n i s m s  is derived from different sources. These sources include 
anti-corruption conventions, anti-corruption guidelines and integrity systems, voluntary 
anti-corruption principles, court rulings, and NATO and U.S. initiated efforts against 
corruption. The data for assessing the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption methods is 
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retrieved from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), Transparency International 
UK, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The data 
illustrated in the cases is derived from Transparency International, U.S. GAO 
documents, and U.S. litigation process documents.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is comprised of seven chapters. 
Chapter I presents this study’s background information, purpose, research 
questions, scope, limitations, assumptions, and methodology. 
Chapter II provides fundamental information about procurement and corruption, 
and then investigates corruption risks that are pertinent to each step in the defense 
procurement cycle. The most vulnerable step in the defense procurement process is 
identified. Sole sourcing and offset arrangements are discussed as among the highest risk 
tools and methods that contribute to defense corruption. 
Chapter III explores the nature of sole sourcing and offset arrangements, and 
provides a deep and detailed picture of related reasons for corruption and inherent risks in 
the defense procurement cycle.  
Chapter IV presents a set of global anti-corruption tools and methods available in 
both the public and private sector that reveal the scale of the fight against corruption. This 
chapter provides information about international anti-corruption conventions, defense 
industry anti-corruption plans, and defense integrity pacts. Additionally, this chapter 
highlights the regulations and efforts against corruption belonging to the world’s most 
significant military organization, NATO, and country with the largest defense industry, 
the USA. 
Chapter V measures the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption tools affiliated 
with major players in defense industries and markets such as the U.S., the UK, Sweden, 
Italy, etc. This chapter proposes a measure of effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts by 




after these states implemented relevant anti-corruption strategies. Finally, a matrix is used 
to reveal how existing anti-corruption conventions match up against key corruption 
vulnerabilities.  
Chapter VI analyzes three different cases involving defense procurement 
corruption. This chapter first presents background information on each of the cases from 
court decisions, scholarly works and news articles, and then investigates these cases to 
identify corruption vulnerabilities. 
Chapter VII provides conclusions from the analysis in the previous chapters, and 




II. THE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT CYCLE AND ATTENDANT 
CORRUPTION RISKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Research question: What are the areas of highest risk involved in the defense 
procurement cycle? And, what are the implications if those areas are not addressed? 
This chapter will first explore the basic characteristics of public procurement and 
corruption. After that, corruption risks throughout the procurement cycle are examined, 
identifying the most vulnerable steps in the procurement process. Finally, offsets and 
single-sourcing risks will be further explored.  
B. THE DEFINITION OF PROCUREMENT 
Public procurement plays a significant role in a government’s primary task of 
delivering public goods.  Governments procure not only products such as pencils, drugs, 
and tanks; they also procure services like security, maintenance, etc.  Governments aim is 
to obtain high quality, and low cost goods and services. A competitive procurement 
process enables governments to leverage the benefits of competitive markets to make the 
most cost-effective purchases. 
Public procurement typically involves significant resources in a given country. 
For developed countries, public procurement usually has a 10–15% share of the GDP, 
while in developing countries procurement involves as much as 20% of GDP (Evenett, 
2002). 
The UN defines public procurement as the “overall process of acquiring goods, 
civil works and services which includes all functions from the identification of needs, 
selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all phases of 
contract administration through the end of a services contract or the useful life of an 




1. Procurement Process 
Overall public procurement frameworks consist of several key components: “laws 
and regulations, workforce, process and methods and organizational structure” (Thai, 
2009, p.8). This chapter addresses only the procurement process and methods 
components of the overall framework. 
Although public procurement officials could make positive contributions to the 
planning and preparation phases of a budget based upon their experience, in practice they 
primarily deal with the execution phase of an approved budget. 
Typical phases of the procurement process include: 
  Procurement planning 
  Requirement definition 
  Sourcing 
  Selection of procurement strategy 
  Preparation & issuance of solicitation documents 
  Receipt and opening of offers 
  Evaluation 
  Contract review and award 
  Contract finalization & issuance 
  Contract management 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2011).  Several key 
principles can be defined for a sound procurement process. These include being based 
upon regulations and rules; being efficient and economic; promoting competition and 
transparency; and strengthening accountability (Campos & Pradhan, 2007).  
C. THE DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
This chapter will explore the lack of transparency and integrity, and corruption 
risks throughout the public procurement cycle, especially in defense procurement.  
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Many definitions exist for corruption. In this chapter, corruption refers to “the 
misuse of public office for private gain” (Klitgaard, MacLean-Abaroa, & Parris, 2000). 
The ‘office’ position might be in public, private or even nonprofit organizations.  
Corruption is obviously not a new phenomenon. Corruption has inflicted negative 
effects on societies and governments across a variety of civilizations. It is visible in 
ancient Chinese history, Indian scriptures, and in the works of Roman historians. 
(Campos & Pradhan, 2007, p. 2) Today, corruption is a top concern for most International 
organizations (such as NGOs and watchdog groups).  Corruption becomes a focal point 
due to its damaging effects on many aspects of a nation’s society, economy and general 
prosperity. Corruption diverts resources provided by taxpayers, aid money from the 
international community, donations, etc., from the goal of providing public goods and 
welfare services.  This process distorts the public financial management system, lowers 
the credibility of governing entities, and creates unstable and unjust environments. 
Corruption negatively affects an economy by reducing investments, which 
consequentially slows down economic growth rates and tax revenues, decreasing the 
efficiency of public investments and country infrastructure (Tanzi, 1998).  
The estimated damage inflicted by corruption may be as high as 50% of a 
contract’s value. A study estimates that more than “1.1 billion EUR public funds (were) 
lost to corruption” in 2005 in the Czech Republic (Transparency International, 2006).  
Public procurement is especially vulnerable to corruption because it has a 
different expenditure profile from other transactions. Public procurement usually involves 
high value and low volume transactions.(Campos & Pradhan, 2007) 
Why does public procurement attract so much attention? The answer lies in the 
important role it plays in both international trade and the economy. In some cases, such 
as in developing countries, public procurement may constitute more than 20% of the 
GDP (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Defense or military procurement also comprises a large 
part of the GDP; for example, defense procurement accounts for more than 70% of all 
federal procurement in the USA (Cox, 2010). 
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D. CORRUPTION RISKS ACROSS THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE 
Corruption risks may occur during any phase of the procurement process. In the 
initial stages of the procurement cycle, requirements can be manipulated and tailored so 
that a particular company will be the only one suitable. Moreover, some provisions that 
will pave the way for corrupt practices, such as offsets and special financing packages, 
may exist in the design phase. The bid evaluation phase can rely on poorly defined and 
arbitrary criteria, rather than well-defined, systematic criteria developed from 
procurement goals and objectives. The awarding of contracts might favor single-sourcing 
rather than full and open competition. Finally, the contract delivery and administrative 
phase may lack oversight and monitoring.  
1. UN Perspective 
The UN presents a general overview of corruption risks in the public procurement 
cycle, and categorizes them into corresponding procurement phases (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), 2011).  They are as follows: 
a. Procurement Planning/Budgeting Risk 
 Inadequate analysis of the supply market, organizational requirements and 
stakeholder needs and issues  
 No planning undertaken, thus no risks assessed  
 Needs falsely inflated or stated in a manner that permits low quality 
goods/services to pass  
 Requirements prepared in a manner that favors or disfavors particular 
suppliers  
 Poorly substantiated “justification” for “waivers”  
 Budgets set artificially high to cover kick-backs 
b. Procurement Selection Process 
 Using inappropriate procurement methods with the aim of finding ways to 
subvert the decision-making processes.  
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 Evaluation criteria designed to favor a particular supplier and disqualify 
others  
 Information shared to favor a particular supplier  
 Restricting the tender pool of potential suppliers or creating shortlists of 
“weak” suppliers against a favored supplier  
 Mishandling tender documents  
 Accepting late bids/proposals  
 Rejecting legitimate bids  
 Inappropriately evaluating a supplier 
 Mishandling bids received 
 Documents submitted by bidders are fraudulent but not detected 
c. Contract Award and Management (Performance) 
 Splitting procurement actions to stay below the threshold for procurement 
review  
 Unrealistically low bid with expectation to later amend the contract  
 Unrealistically high caliber goods/experts later replaced by inferior ones  
 Corrupt subcontractors  
 Contract is different from bid/proposal in terms of specifications, 
quantities, level of effort, delivery schedule and payment terms  
 Oversight and reporting requirements minimized in contract to avoid 
scrutiny  
 Inadequate personnel for oversight  
 Acceptance of cost overruns  
 Manipulation and destruction of supporting documentation  
 Splitting contracts/purchase orders to avoid scrutiny 
 Unjustified contract extension or amendment 
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2. Transparency International Perspective 
Transparency International provides another perspective of defense procurement 
corruption risks in the procurement cycle (Transparency International Defence, 2011a): 
a. Government Policy: Privileged defense relations; defense budgets; 
external financing; manufacturing government pressure on 
importers 
b. Capability Gap Definition: Military, political & commercial 
influence 
c. Requirement/Contract Definition: Inadequate/corrupt 
military/official expertise, anonymous agents; ‘justified opacity’, 
excessive use of national secrecy 
d. Support Requirements Definition: Costly & complex 
e. Outline Project Costing: Unreliable data 
f. Tender: Single sourcing; bidder collusion; lack of transparency; 
offset requirements; inadequate timescales 
g. Bid Assessment & Contract Award: Evaluation manipulation; 
favored bidders; offsets bias outcome; lack of transparency; failure 
to consider value for money 
h. Manufacture & Delivery: Variation order; lack of official control; 
incorrect equipment performance and lack of remedial contract 
measures 
i. In-Service Phase: Call-off contracts; lack of expertise; lack of 
long-term oversight (especially for service contracts) 
Of all the procurement process steps, the tender phase emerges as the area of 
highest risk in the procurement cycle. This is especially true when it involves a sole-
source selection process, collusion among bidders, and offset requirements that 
complicate oversight and monitoring efforts. 
The Defense and Security Program of Transparency International identifies nine 
areas of risk in the procurement process: “technical requirements, single-sourcing, agents 
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and brokers, collusive bidders, financing package, offsets, contract award and delivery, 
subcontractors, and seller influence”(Transparency International Defense, 2011b ) 
For the scope of this project, technical requirements, single sourcing, and offsets 
will be analyzed in the next section.  
Key areas area vulnerable to corruption will be discussed in detail. 
3. Key Corruption Risks 
a. Technical Requirements 
Defining technical requirements is one the initial stages of the 
procurement cycle. Corruption risk at this stage arises from “the complexity and high 
monetary value of defense contracts, as well their direct connection to national security 
and thick wall of secrecy and confidentiality shielding them” (Transparency 
International Defense, 2011c). 
It is natural for states to protect their crucial and key defense matters and 
surround them with secrecy, but it is not appropriate to assign a blanket of secrecy to 
most basic commercial goods and services. It is actually indicated that “in many cases, 
some 70–80 per cent of contracts (by value) do not need their current confidentiality 
marking” (Transparency International Defense, 2011a). 
The close buyer-supplier relationship that exists in defense procurements 
makes it easy to perform corrupt practices and to obscure the acquisition process. 
b. Single Sourcing 
Single-source procurement contracts are defined by Pyman et al. (2009) as 
“contracts awarded by a government to a company without competitive process. Such 
contracts are also referred to as sole-source, non-competitive, or no-bid.” 
Lack of competition, as in a market economy, distorts and threatens the 
ultimate goal of obtaining the best value for money spent in a public procurement.  There 
could be justifications for single-sourcing, such as emergency situations that bypass 
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bureaucratic levels of oversight and analysis that can slow the process.  However, other 
than these rare cases, single sourcing poses an important corruption risk; a single defense 
related goods or services provider can establish close relations with defense procurement 
organizations, creating pressure through the strategic lobbying of lawmakers to pass 
regulations that facilitate the awarding of contracts to a favored provider.  
In a competitive defense procurement processes, due to the many steps of 
oversight and analysis, corruption becomes much more difficult to implement. Concerns 
and questions can be brought to the attention of the public and media by the losing 




c. Offsets  
Offsets in defense procurement are the agreements in which a buyer 
requires that suppliers invest a portion of the contract back into the investing country as a 
condition of the purchase of defense services and/or articles (Martin, 1996). The U.S. 
government defines offsets as;  
The industrial compensation practices that foreign governments or 
companies require U.S. firms to enter into as a condition of purchase in 
either government-to-government or commercial sales of defense articles 
and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. § 2751, et seq.) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130).  In defense trade, such industrial compensation 
can include mandatory co-production, licensed production, subcontractor 
production, technology transfer, and foreign investment. (U.S Department 
of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, 2011) 
Defense export sales have often included offset arrangements. The use of 
offsets dates back to late 1950s in Japan and Europe (GAO, 1997). Offsets can serve as 
industrial policy tools that compensate the purchaser’s economy (and tax payers) for a 
large public investment not directly perceived to benefit the population to improve 
balance-of-payments accounts. However, the defense investments themselves are 
designed to enhance the country’s defense capabilities (Transparency International 
Defence, 2011d). 
Offsets pose serious corruption risks, particularly to defense. “The 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union prohibit them, for 
example. However, the GPA and the EU make an exception for defense procurement, 
while the GPA also allows exceptions for developing countries” (Transparency 
International Defence, 2011d). 
Due to their opaque, complex, and highly technical nature, offsets often 





no transparency and accountability. The combination of these factors contributes to 
increasing corruption related risks and the emergence of new opportunities for defense 
corruption. (Muravska et al., 2010). 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the tender phase is the step in the defense procurement process 
most vulnerable to corruption risks; while offsets and single sourcing pose the most 
important corruption risks. 





III. ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 
AGGREMENTS (OFFSETS) AND SINGLE SOURCING 
A. BACKGROUND OF OFFSETS 
1. Introduction and Definitions 
The era preceding the end of the Cold War was dominated by arms suppliers who 
controlled markets and set prices. However, soon after the end of the Cold War demand 
for major weapon systems collapsed. Reduced demand meant countries could now 
pressure suppliers putting stress on the industry (Suman M. G., Offsets In International 
Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005).  
The political transformation of the world transformed the defense market. There 
were few buyers and many sellers. To stay in business, companies needed to “make their 
offers virtually irresistible with promises of lucrative ‘add-ons’, collectively called 
offsets” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 
2005). Companies accepted that, without offsets, they would be excluded from the 
majority of international sales (Martinez, 2010).  
In basic terms, offsets are the requirements demanders ask of defense equipment 
suppliers in order to provide financial relief (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms 
Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005), and reduce their huge cost burdens of 
acquiring major weapon systems (Jurgen Brauer, 2005, s. 2). According to these 
requirements, supplier companies have to reinvest a percentage of their main contract 
back into the importing country, in order to “offset” the expenditure (Transparency 
International UK).  
Over time, offsets developed from add-ons into an integral part of all defense 
contracts (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National 
Policy, 2005). Offsets exist today as “necessary pre-conditions for the sale and purchase 
of defense-related hardware and, to a lesser extent, certain high-value civilian equipment, 
in those countries that require it” (Martinez, 2010). 
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Typically, strategic buyers try to extract as much as possible from these lucrative 
‘add-ons,’ and use them to boost their national economy by redirecting the cash outflow 
to their industrial base. In other words, it is “some sort of a leverage exploited by a buyer 
to obtain compensatory benefits by asking the seller to undertake well-designated 
activities to improve the economy of the buying country” (Suman M. G., Offsets In 
International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005).  
The potential positive effects, or the leverage expected out of the offsets, are 
valuable investments that would create jobs, encourage the growth of localized defense 
related industries and national economies , and compensate the purchaser’s economy for 
a large public investment not directly beneficial to the country’s population (Jurgen 
Brauer, 2005) (Transparency International UK).  
In addition to “justifying arms expenditure,” offsets also emerged as instruments 
to contend with hostile public opinion against defense spending (Suman M. G., Offsets In 
International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). 
2. Types of Offsets 
Typically, offsets are either direct or indirect. Direct offsets investments directly 
related to the acquisition of the purchaser (Jurgen Brauer, 2005). Their simple form may 
include buy-backs, “co-productions or licensed production or sub-contracts of the system 
and its sub-systems” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A 
National Policy, 2005). This arrangement incorporates the buyer into the production stage 
of the main weapon systems, its sub-assemblies, and the components they are contracted 
to purchase. Therefore, the countries that seek to develop their defense industrial base 
generally require direct offsets since they are “accepted to be the best form of direct 
offsets is technology transfer” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need 
For A National Policy, 2005). 
Indirect offsets, which can be military or civilian, are not related to the subject of 
the acquisition (Transparency International UK). These offsets can take the form of 
foreign investment and countertrade (barter, counter-purchases, and buy-backs) (Jurgen 
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Brauer, 2005, s. 3). They can actually be regarded as pure trade arrangements where “the 
sellers, buy or help in finding a buyer for a specific percentage from the original importer 
within a specified period” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For 
A National Policy, 2005). Currently, because buyer countries have realized the immense 
economic and social potential of offsets, there are twice as many indirect offsets than 
direct offsets (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National 
Policy, 2005). Generally, countries without a required level of absorptive capacity in their 
national industrial defense bases try to use indirect offsets to gain other benefits from 
their defense imports (E. Anders Eriksson, 2007, s. 4). Indirect offsets may be completely 
unrelated to a company’s core business, and performing activities outside of this scope 
may require significant use of offset service providers and consultants, which can easily 
expose the contract to corruption risks. (Jeffery Taylor, 2011, s. 298) 
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has categorized offset 
transactions as follows: co-production, technology transfer, subcontracting, credit 
assistance, training, licensed production, investment, purchases, and other. The diagram 
below illustrates how each category is classified as direct and/or indirect (U.S. 
Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, 2010).  
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Figure 3.   Classification of Offset Transaction Categories  (U.S. Department of Commerce 
Bureau of Industry and Security, 2010) 
3. Objectives of Defense Offsets 
With regard to giving and receiving offset work, each country can be 
allocated to one of three groups. First, there is the USA that largely 
exports equipment and thus does not receive, but rather provides offsets. 
Second, there are a small number of states like France, Germany and UK 
that both import and export armaments and thus who both provide and 
receive offsets. Finally, there are a large number of states that largely 
import defense equipment and who thus typically only receive offset 
work. (Martin, 1996) 
As stated above, there are supplying and receiving parties in defense offsets that 
hold idiosyncratic objectives. In broad terms, countries importing weapon systems 
require offsets for a variety of reasons that include easing economic burdens, increasing 
or preserving domestic employment, obtaining desired technology, and promoting 
targeted industrial sectors (Impact of Offsets in Defense Trade: An Annual Report to 
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Congress, 2010). Obviously, all of these objectives should be consonant with national 
economic objectives. They should be broad-based and fulfill an economic need (Suman 
M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). 
More specifically, every country identifies one or more of the objectives stated 
above, and tailors these offsets to satisfy those nation-specific goal (Suman M. G., 
Defence Offsets: proving detrimental to the services, 2010). However, it should not be 
forgotten that “arms importing countries’ offset objectives evolve over time and their 
strategies change as their objectives evolve” (Jurgen Brauer, 2005). In the absence of 
well evolved objectives, offsets may become less focused and be highly wasteful (Suman 
M. G., Defence Offsets: proving detrimental to the services, 2010).  
Developing countries like Singapore and Taiwan have specifically targeted arms 
niches in which they want to be prime manufacturers, whereas countries like Brazil, India 
and Indonesia, with regional power status, have attempted to create the domestic 
capability to produce a comprehensive range of weapon systems. In addition, states like 
South Korea seek the ability to produce a wide spectrum of systems in order to broadly 
participate in industrial markets, where states like Poland view arms offsets as an 
opportunity to revitalize their collapsed, indigenous arms industry. South Africa aims to 
simply obtain the arms and keep the money at home as well (Jurgen Brauer, 2005, p. 6). 
Offset demands are structured to fulfill these objectives and implement national 
strategies.  
From the perspective of the USA as the largest offset supplier, offsets have served 
“important foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States, such as 
increasing the industrial capabilities of allied countries, standardizing military equipment, 
and modernizing allied forces” (Impact of Offsets in Defense Trade: An Annual Report 
to Congress, 2010). The primary motivation for weapons transfers through the 1950s was 
to help allied countries counter any possible Soviet thrust into Western Europe. In the 
1960s, the offset agreement with West Germany was designed to minimize the impact of 
a balance-of-payments deficit (Maskus, 1996, s. 358). Additional U.S. objectives can be 
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listed as “increasing interoperability of weapons systems among its allies and, expanding 
the range of military suppliers available” (Maskus, 1996, s. 373). 
However, the approach of the U.S. has changed because of their “economically 
inefficient and market distorting effects” (U.S Department of Commerce Bureau of 
Industry and Security).  The USA considers offsets as: 
…a burden on its economy and a necessary evil, which cannot be wished 
away. In 1999, the Congress had opined that unilateral efforts by the U.S. 
to prohibit offsets may be impractical in the current era of globalization 
and would severely hinder the competitiveness of the U.S. defense 
industry in the global market. It accepts that offsets are a part of the 
current defense trade environment. (Suman, 2005) 
4. Progressive Effects and Economic Values of Offsets 
The use of offsets is now commonplace. Today, virtually all countries who import 
defense equipment require some type of offset. There are approximately 130 countries 
using offset agreements (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A 
National Policy, 2005). Between 1993 and 2009, the average value of 736 offset 
agreements signed by 49 U.S. firms with 46 different countries amounted to 70.14% of 
the value of the contracts. The total value was $75.90 billion (U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, 2010). A European Defense Industry and 
Market report estimated that, among European Union Members, the value of offsets was 
around $5,880 M, and the average offset percentage was 135% (E. Anders Eriksson, 
2007). These numbers imply the total value of the offset programs provided by the arms 
sellers to the European defense equipment buyers. 
Indigenous development and production of defense equipment will, theoretically, 
“provide an independent capability for the required equipment, as well as the most 
benefit for the domestic economy in terms of jobs and technology acquisition” (Martin, 
1996, s. 1). States that are unable to possess this ability have sought “offset” agreements 
in order to achieve this goal. Yet, even if offsets are thought to hold “important potential 




how well offsets work in practice” (Jurgen Brauer, 2005). The economic and 
developmental contributions of offsets to countries importing arms have questionable 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
Normally, it is expected that offsets reduce the costs of procuring arms for the 
importing country by stimulating job creation, creating a foundation for defense industrial 
bases, and transferring general and specific technology, “since technology is seen as the 
key to future economic prosperity” (Jurgen Brauer, 2005, p. 7). Furthermore, it is 
assumed there will not be more costs than from off-the-shelf arms purchases (Jurgen 
Brauer, 2005, p. 8). However, no country is eager to transfer their latest technology as an 
offset to an importing country without commercial gains (Suman M. G., Offsets In 
International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). “As Dumas points out, the 
foremost objective of the arms seller is to make a sale and profit, not to contribute 
economic development” (Haines, 2004, p. 312). “Even if the technology is deemed free 
as an offset, the seller invariably tries to charge an inflated price for jigs, fixtures, test 
beds, training and technical documentation” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms 
Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005).  
From a contractor’s perspective, contractual offset requirements impose added 
risks and penalties for non-performance. Because, they include the potential cost of offset 
program failure in their weapon sale programs (Martinez, 2010). Markusen states that the 
administrative cost of offsets for seller companies runs from 7% to 10% of a contract’s 
value (Baskaran, 2004). Because of these additional costs, companies usually attach 
premiums that include expenses not present in the absence of offsets (Jurgen Brauer, 
2005, s. 4). Briefly, offset contracts were more expensive than off-the-shelf arms 
purchases (Jurgen Brauer, 2005, s. 1).  
In addition to cost inflations, economists approach arguments of job creation 
suspiciously (Julia Muravska, 2010). For example, Saudi Arabia’s $3.8 billion defense 
offset for the 1985 U.S. Peace Shield program was expected to create approximately 
75,000 jobs, but employed only 3,540 members staff (as of 2009) (Pfeifer S. , 2010). 
Another example is South Africa, which approved a R29.9 billion arms contract, and 
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expected the attached offsets, worth of R106 billion, to create 65,000 jobs over a 7 year 
period (Lamb, 2004, p. 284).  However, Dunne and Lamb criticized this promise: “a cost 
of R1.6 million per job is extremely high, nearly 20 times the average cost per job in 
South Africa’s defense industry” (p 288). 
Regarding offsets associated with the transfer of technology, it is crucial to 
highlight that an importing country should have a “high degree of local technological 
absorptive capacity” to accomplish the expected improvements in the industrial base 
(Matthews, 1996).   
The technology sought should be such that the recipient can exploit it fully 
by developing its other applications as well. That will provide the 
necessary economies of scale. The buyer nation should also match the 
technology sought with its own capability for absorption. The greatest 
drawback of technology transfer as an offset is that it is very difficult to 
measure its real impact and effectiveness. (Suman, 2005)  
Successful offset projects should establish long-term industrial partnerships that 
continue to benefit countries even after the contractual obligation has been fulfilled and, 
the “transferred technology must make the local defense industry self-sustaining” 
(Martinez, 2010, s. 3)  (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A 
National Policy, 2005). However, this is not guaranteed (Martinez, 2010). Offsets operate 
on a contract-by-contract basis, and sub-contracting benefits wane once the foreign 
supplier has completed its offset obligations; this is because compensation contracts do 
not compel the principal contractor to maintain industrial ties with subcontractors (Struys, 
1996). For example, India’s defense industry was able to obtain certain technologies, but 
“failed to acquire capabilities sufficient to close the technology gap with developed 
countries and keep pace with technological change in weapon systems” (Baskaran, 2004, 
s. 219). 
In summary, offset programs are widespread, and theoretically offer important 
benefits to an acquiring country.  Yet, proper selection, detailed planning, close 
supervision, and regular monitoring are keys to their success and value (Suman M. G., 
Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). Otherwise, 
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offset programs can be wasteful and uneconomical. For this reason, a careful program 
selection method should be devised in order to evaluate their “viability, estimated credit 
value, monitoring ease, and demonstrability of accruing benefits.” (Suman M. G., Offsets 
In International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005As Brauer (2004) 
mentions, each country should organize an audit team for arms trade offsets that would 
be responsible for measuring the full economic costs of defense acquisition deals (Lamb, 
2004). 
B. CORRUPTION RISKS INVOLVED IN OFFSET AGREEMENTS 
1. Vulnerability of Offsets to Corruption 
Offsets attract consistent criticism for their inefficiency and market distortion, but 
they are growing rapidly without any serious attempt to ascertain their value and ability 
to deliver their promised benefits (Julia Muravska, 2010). Despite criticisms, however, 
offsets are not inherently condemned to failure, and do not necessarily entail grand 
corruption. In fact, if constructed and analyzed properly, they are able to yield benefits to 
importing countries (Julia Muravska, 2010, p 2). However, not all information pertaining 
to offsets is duly published. “Sellers are generally reluctant to reveal the quantity of 
offsets they had to offer to clinch a deal. They term it as commercially sensitive 
information” (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National 
Policy, 2005). Additionally, companies seldom disclose their offset obligations, or the 
premium they charge importing governments for delivering their offset requirements. 
This lack of transparency throughout the process is responsible for the significant 
corruption risks often accompanying offsets (Julia Muravska, 2010).  
Moreover, offset deals are conducted in a highly opaque atmosphere “with 
decisions made away from legitimate scrutiny, and contracts awarded on a discretionary 
basis. This shield from attention yields higher corruption risk in offset arrangements” 
(Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). Because of this complexity and opacity, offset deals receive 
little attention (Transparency International - UK). Normally, when processes are not fully 
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scrutinized, and “unobservable, the potential private benefits of corruption are high, 
malfeasance is likely” (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). 
There are additional factors that make offset agreements vulnerable to corruption 
(Julia Muravska, 2010). “Elements crucially missing in these offset characteristics are 
offset contract monitoring, auditing, and feedback to the importing country’s defense 
contract-issuing organization” and lack of accountability, highly technical structure, and 
the large monetary volumes of contracts. (Julia Muravska, 2010)  Moreover, offsets often 
entail no repercussions for failure to deliver the projects (Jurgen Brauer, 2005, s. 7) (Julia 
Muravska, 2010).  
As mentioned previously, governments use defense offsets as industrial policy 
tools to influence their country’s economic development. However, this intervention may 
also generate vested interests (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010, p 15). Transparency 
International’s most recent report notes that the functional authority of officials in offset 
arrangements can create incentives for companies to manipulate officials in their favor, 
rather than going through competitive activities. In this setting, inefficient suppliers can 
be undeservingly awarded contracts in exchange for bribes to officials. As a result, 
offsets serve as potent vehicles for bribery rather than their original purpose (Ben 
Magahy F. V., 2010). 
Another sensitive area of offset arrangements is the increased amount of agency 
involvement from figures such as political office holders, procurement officials, 
exporting country officials, brokers, consultants to third party officers, and potential 
beneficiary companies. The presence of so many players in a transaction makes the 
process more prone to corruption because it is difficult to properly follow such a large 
number of negotiations, and therefore it is also difficult to identify irregularities (Ben 
Magahy F. V., 2010). Additionally, the wide variety of offsets offered makes it costly and 
difficult to monitor transactions.  
An additional vulnerability of offset arrangements is their valuation, which is “not 
done in monetary value but through offset credits” (Julia Muravska, 2010). Offsets are 
commonly assigned a ‘multiplier value,’ which is applied to the actual value of an offset 
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transaction to calculate the credit value earned. It is a method of assigning weight to 
different offset programs. Buyers use multipliers to provide sellers with incentives to 
offer offsets in the areas of their choice (Suman M. G., Offsets In International Arms 
Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). In most cases, however, the multipliers used to 
calculate offset credits are determined confidentially during the negotiation stage, which 
renders them subjective and arbitrary (Julia Muravska, 2010). During the determination 
phase of multiplier values, it is highly possible that biased public officials make implicit 
recommendations to channel offset agreements to favor specific companies.  
According to legal frameworks, offsets are illegal in the majority of trade 
agreements and industries. “The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the 
World Trade Organization, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
European Union prohibit them. However, the GPA and the EU make an exception for 
defense procurement, while the GPA also allows exceptions for developing countries” 
(Transparency International - UK).  Offsets, linked to billion Euro defense contracts, are 
also extensively criticized in Europe and the United States (Graeme, 2011).  
When joining the GPA, developing countries can negotiate offsets during the 
qualification phase of tenders; however, offsets may not be used as award criteria, and 
procurement processes including offsets may be excluded from the scope of the GPA if 
other governments find it necessary to protect their own national security interests (Ben 
Magahy F. V., 2010). General procurement rules in the EU also prohibit offsets, but 
Article 296 makes an exception: “necessity for the protection of the essential national 
security interests which are connected with arms production” allows states to consider 
offsets mechanisms while procuring military equipment (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010).  
Under the current legal frameworks and regulations concerning offsets, governments 
always have enough leeway to justify their reasoning (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). 
2. Related Corruption Types and Structural Loopholes  
The Transparency International’s report on offsets (2010) identifies two 
categories of offset corruptions. Under the first category, “corruption is restricted to the 
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scope of offsets and entails the parties involved in the definition, negotiation, 
management and monitoring of offset programs obtaining undue benefits from the offsets 
themselves” (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). Relevant examples include an “obligor bribing 
public officials to release offset credits, without actual contract fulfillment, or the obligor 
buying invoices from local companies, that is, from projects unrelated to contractual 
offsets, and presenting them as such” (Julia Muravska, 2010). 
The second category is distinguished by the use of offsets to complete a 
corruption cycle within an acquisition. As mentioned before, offsets are usually less 
scrutinized than major contracts. This lack of auditing allows funds to be easily 
transferred to corrupt hands via offsets. For example, offset projects with excess profit 
margins may allow the beneficiary company to use a pre-negotiated part of this margin to 
bribe officials able to fix the lucrative contract (Julia Muravska, 2010, p. 4). The need for 
a specific capability can be inappropriately influenced (Ben Magahy D. S., 2009) by 
corrupted public officials, and the offset projects can be set to favor the companies 
directly or indirectly related to those officials (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). For example, in 
the Czech Republic, purchases of Gripen fighters raised questions about the included 
offset package; investigations concerning the structure of the tendering process revealed 
that senior Czech officials had been paid to intentionally form a contract biased towards 
the selection of Gripen fighters (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010, s. 30). 
As these examples show, there is a considerable amount of opportunities for 
corruption to penetrate these notoriously opaque arrangements (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010, 
s. 18).  In addition to the characteristics of offsets, the structural vulnerabilities of these 
arrangements can be discerned by focusing on the actors involved. In his study, Suman 
arranges the offset process into five stages: Policy Stage, Planning Stage, Negotiation 
Stage, Implementation and Monitoring Stage, and Feedback and Review Stage (Suman 
M. G., Offsets In International Arms Trade Need For A National Policy, 2005). 
Similarly, TI’s Defense Offsets Report also describes five main stages of offset 
programs: Decision of government, Tendering Process, Assessment of Bids, Design of 
the Offset Package, and Award of Contracts (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010).   
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In each stage, structural loopholes generate opportunities for a variety of members 
involved in the arrangement to corruptly influence the process. These actors and key 
vulnerabilities are summarized by TI under three main headlines detailed below (Ben 
Magahy F. V., 2010). 
a. Political Corruption 
Political corruption results from the discretion granted to political officials 
in the public procurement process—specifically in the area of offset packages. Corrupt 
activities occur “when politicians or functionaries use their privileged access to resources 
(in whatever form) illegitimately to benefit themselves or others” (Heywood, 2002). 
Political actors may create the need for unnecessary offset packages, then award them to 
a bargaining contractor and pocket the offset funds (Julia Muravska, 2010). 
Internationally, offsets can be used by government officials of exporting countries, who 
offer offsets as benefits to political figures in the importing country (Ben Magahy F. V., 
2010). 
b. Bureaucratic Corruption 
Similar to political corruption, bureaucratic corruption can also take place 
in any stage of offset arrangements. The procurement personnel of the defense ministries 
or the related procurement agencies most likely have discretion in shaping offset 
arrangements (Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). For example, a main supplier company may use 
offsets to bribe officials rather than paying those bribes monetarily, which would expose 
them to further scrutiny (Julia Muravska, 2010). This relatively sheltered method is risk-
free for both procurement officials and company agents. The discretionary power of state 
officials creates a gap of transparency, and makes the procurement personnel key 
instruments for carrying out corrupt activities.   
c. Private Sector Corruption 
For corrupt activities to occur, at least two parties need to be involved: 
solicitor and supplier. The private sector remains on the supply side of the corruption 
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(Ben Magahy F. V., 2010). In most of the previously mentioned examples, companies 
make payments or establish grounds for state officials to obtain personal gains. In some 
cases, this is done by companies’ own initiatives to safeguard a contract, or solicited by 
the state officials as a prerequisite for the contract award (Julia Muravska, 2010). In other 
cases, the bidder companies make payments to contractor companies in order to access 
offset packages, which is called “private-to-private corruption” (Ben Magahy F. V., 
2010). It is arguable that there are fewer incentives for this behavior in a competitive 
market that penalizes inefficiency (Argandona, 2003). However, larger companies may 
actually shift the burden of bribing state officials to smaller companies. 
C. SINGLE-SOURCING IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND 
ASSOCIATED RISKS 
1. Introduction and Definitions 
Single source contracts, also called sole-source contracts, are awarded to a 
company without going through competitive awarding phases (Regina Wilson, The 
Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first 
Look, 2006). The appearance of single-sourcing in defense contracts can be traced back 
to WWII, but by the end of the cold war there was a significant decline in the demand for 
defense equipment.  This compelled “arms-producing companies be consolidated or 
turned into civilian facilities in order to remain economically viable” (Regina Wilson, 
The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A 
first Look, 2006). After creating “national champions” through mergers, it was critical for 
governments to secure their existence through single-source contracts. However, a 2010 
report in the U.S. stated; 
 ..because of the ever-shrinking pool of defense contractors (which 
ironically is partly the result of the peace dividend Washington urged 
contractors to take part in at the end of the Cold War), the government 
often has ‘little choice other than to rely on the contractors that were the 
original equipment manufacturers. (GAO, 2010) 
Agencies use a series of competitive exceptions for contracts.  The two most 
common are the presence of “only one responsible source,” and statute mandates to sole-
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source awards, such as in the U.S. Small Business Administration’s business 
development program. (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011) “In other 
cases, program offices may press for contracts to be awarded to a specific contractor 
without competition, due to their previous relationship and the contractors understanding 
of program requirements” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
There are also other reasons presented for single-source procurement in the defense 
industry: the desire to award maintenance of a product to the original producer, “the need 
for ‘freedom of action’ which is the ability to conduct operations independent from other 
states or entities” (Currie, 2011), the existence of rights in data, patent rights, copyrights, 
or trade secrets which makes service available from only one source, and standardization 
requirements for replacement items which are available from only one source.  
Governments use of single-source contracting can be rational, and in favor of the State in 
several contexts. For example, agency operations can be delayed by soliciting and 
evaluating offers from suppliers. Additionally, because of the related costs of soliciting 
and evaluating offers, government’s costs in competing contracts can be more than the 
savings it realizes from the competitive contracting. (Manuel, 2011) But even in these 
circumstances sole-source contracts hold much higher corruption risks than competitive 
contracts. (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk 
in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006) Competitive contracts are important to save 
the taxpayer money, improve contractor performance, prevent corruption, and promote 
accountability for results. However, since sole source contracts lack the benefits of 
competition in quality and cost, they undermine transparency in source selection, and 
hence can encourage corrupt acts in defense procurement. (Knut Leipold, 2009) Without 
the guidance and oversight of the competitive process defense procurements would be 
more prone to corruption (Manuel, 2011).  
In a 2009 report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense presented their 





expressed the ultimate desire for an industrial base that was reliable and cost-effective, 
with an ability to meet strategic objectives. The report described a “cost-effective” 
industrial base as a; 
 ..competitive industrial base with at least two viable innovative suppliers 
with strong design teams in mature market areas and a greater number in 
market areas where demand is high and innovation is critical to meet 
future operational objectives (Department of Defense, 2009).  
However, the 2008 FY Report of the U.S. Department of Defense on Foreign 
Sources of Supply depicts that in the fiscal year 2007, 68.04% of all contracts for defense 
items and components were awarded by non-competitive contract value, and 40.11% by 
contract number (United States Department of Defense, 2008). This ratio provides 
evidence for Transparency International’s argument that “countries that claim to employ 
single-source rarely, often have high percentages of non-competitive defense 
procurements” (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption 
Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006). 
2. Legal Frameworks in United States and Europe 
In the U.S., the Competition in Contracting ACT (CICA) of 1984 mandated that 
the government must use full and open competition in procurement activities, and allow 
all responsible companies to vie for government contracts. This regulation restricts 
procurement officials from awarding contracts to companies solely based on their past 
business relations, previous high quality products, and punctual delivery (Stanberry, 
2009).  
However, the act specifies seven exceptions that allow for sole-source contracts.  
The exceptions are: 
 When only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will 
satisfy agency requirements. 
 The existence of unusual and compelling urgency. 




 When disclosure of the government’s needs would threaten national 
security. 
 When “full and open competition” contradicts the public’s best interest. 
 When authorization or requirement by a statute 
 In the case of an International agreement or treaty between the United 
States and a foreign government or international organization  
These “exceptions” cover common situations in which competition is not 
possible, or when the government values other objectives (e.g., maintaining the industrial 
base) more than full and open competition (Manuel, 2011). CICA also requires 
contracting officers to provide justifications for all noncompetitive procurements 
(Stanberry, 2009). 
This act specified that contracts should be awarded on the basis of best value, 
stating that in many cases, quality may predominate cost factors in selections. John T. 
Welch Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Acquisition for the Air Force, explained in 1988 that 
the purpose behind the CICA “was not to establish competition for competition’s sake, 
but to foster it as part of an overall effort to achieve the best value for our taxpayer’s 
dollars” (Klaes W. Wandland, 1993). 
“The EU Defense Procurement Directive governs the procurement procedures for 
defense and non-military security supply, services and works contracts. This law is 
applicable in all EU Member States” as of 2011 (Maelcamp, 2011). The aim of this 
directive is:  
..to harmonize acquisition procedures throughout the EU: first by 
increasing competition and encouraging cross-border bidding among 
European bidders, so as to prevent systematic sole-source procurement or 
non-competitive procurement from national suppliers; second, by 
increasing transparency through the obligation to advertise defense 
contracts in the EU Official Journal. (Maelcamp, 2011) 
According to Article 346 of the Treaty (formerly Article 296), the EU’s 
procurement rules previously allowed deviations from normal competitive requirements; 
this meant that defense procurement contracts could be excused from European open 
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market rules (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption 
Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006) when a good or service required 
secrecy, necessitated special security measures, or concerned a state’s essential security 
interests (DCAF, 2006).  According to EDA press release of 2005, “more than 50% of 
defense procurement by EU governments was done outside the framework of the EC 
rules on public procurement because of that exemption” (Heuninckx, 2008). However, in 
the updated Defense Procurement Directive, the European Commission strongly criticizes 
Member States for abusing the national security exemption.  The directive mandates 
more transparent and competitive defense procurements (Maelcamp, 2011). 
According to the new directive, member countries are obliged to advertise 
contracts, have a minimum of three competing bidders, and award contracts based on the 
absolute best value (Maelcamp, 2011). The exceptions to this contract are 
 Very sensitive contracts like intelligence services, counter-intelligence 
activities, and border protection. 
 Cooperative programs under NATO, OCCAR, or the European Defense 
Agency (EDA). 
 International agreements or arrangements between Member States and 
third countries. 
 Cooperative programs between MODs based on R&D, but only to the 
extent that the aim is to develop “new” equipment. 
3. Facts and Figures 
Even though quantitative data regarding single-source procurements is difficult to 
obtain, and often cited as “sensitive” by defense ministries, current data allows us to 
deduce the inclination of governments for single-source procurement. Transparency 
International’s 2006 report provides a comprehensive and concentrated study on the issue 
(Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk in 





difficulties in acquiring quantitative data limit the report’s scope to a small number of 
countries, namely Ireland, Portugal, UK, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Japan, and the 
Czech Republic.  
In 2005, the EU’s average for single-source procurement activities was around 
50% by contract value. By contract number, the range is between 20% and 65%, and by 
contract value 3% to 84% (Regina Wilson, 2006). The UK has different statistics. 
According to TI’s report, the percentage of single-source procurements in the UK is 
around 30% by value (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant 
Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006); however, a recent 
independent report presents the average to be around 40% by value, with a cash value of 
£8.7bn per year between 2005–2010 (Currie, 2011). According to the same report, 
“single source contracts in the UK are estimated to account for approximately 70% of 
cost overruns, significantly greater than their 40% share of procurement value.” 
Poland, Japan and the Czech Republic have relatively high averages of 65%, 80% 
and 85% respectively. With 3% and 22%, Ireland and Portugal have the lowest non-
competitive procurement averages (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and 
Attendant Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006); these two 
countries have relatively small domestic defense industries and economies. It can be 
deduced that smaller defense budgets may follow more rigorous procurement procedures, 
and there is no pressure from domestic defense industries to follow inward oriented 
procurement policies (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant 
Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006). 
Similar to the UK, the U.S. also publishes its data about non-competitive 
contracts (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk 
in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006). According to the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS), only 35% of the DoD contracts were awarded non-competitively in 
2010; the average was approximately 32% between 2005–2010 (Jesse Ellman, 2011, s. 
24).  FPDS data shows “the dollar amount of “non-competed” contracts has nearly tripled 
since 2001, rocketing from 50 billion in 2001 to more than $140 billion in 2010. 
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However, there is a quite a bit difference between these numbers and the numbers 
in the FY08 Report of U.S. Department of Defense on Foreign Sources of Supply. This 
report discloses that in 2007, 68.04% of all contracts for defense items and components 
awarded non-competitive by value, and 40.11% by number (United States Department of 
Defense, 2008). This significant difference can be accounted for by the exclusion of 
certain contracts in the FPDS data, such as large umbrella contracts, and indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts (Weinberger, 2011).   
In recent years, U.S. defense non-competitive contracts are a higher percentage by 
number than by value (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing and Attendant 
Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006).  
4. Inherent Corruption Risks 
The defense sector is a highly vulnerable sector. Under the veils of secrecy and 
national interests (Transparency International, 2006), this sector funds a relatively low 
number of contracts with large budgets (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single Sourcing 
and Attendant Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006). In this 
environment, single-source procurement can easily further allow corruption to permeate 
the process, which is already prone to corruption (Regina Wilson, The Extent of Single 
Sourcing and Attendant Corruption Risk in Defense Procurement: A first Look, 2006). 
Single-source procurements kill competition; the potential for acquiring higher 
quality goods and services for lower costs is wasted. In addition to the lost opportunity to 
gain valuable contracts, the lack of competition can provide the freedom to become 
entangled with corrupt hands (Manuel, 2011). The lack of a competitive process excludes 
layers of control and supervision from experts, and parliamentary oversight to evaluate 
bids and readily reveal corrupt acts (DCAF, 2006). 
In a defense procurement environment that commonly uses single-source 
contracting, responsible officers hold great discretionary power in awarding lucrative 
contracts to companies. Contracting officials can exploit this discretionary power to favor 
their personal interests. Corrupt personnel may write tender documents to favor only one 
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company (Transparency International, 2004, s. 9); they may also set “unrealistically short 
bidding periods that limits participation and possibly lead to failure of tender, collusion, and 
nepotism” (ABD/EOCD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and Pacific, 2006). 
Corrupt environments are also commonly created through the deliberate failure of 
open tendering. Corrupt procurement personnel can easily cause the failure of procurement 
outcomes by setting inadequate bidding conditions, or unrealistic/contradictory requirements, 
specifications.  
Another method limiting competition, is to insufficiently publicize bid opening. 
Contracts then receive an insufficient number of responsive bids, so that corrupt officers can 
justify direct or single-source contracting methods (ABD/EOCD Anti-Corruption Initiative 
for Asia and Pacific, 2006). This increases the opportunity for collusion, favoritism and 
nepotism; because such a small number of competitors have an interest in the proceedings, 
the procurement receives less scrutiny (ABD/EOCD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and 
Pacific, 2006). 
It is also possible that bidders collude with each other to choose a “winner,” who 
later compensates the other companies; bidding then appears to be sufficiently 
competitive, but in reality is the exact opposite (Transparency International, 2004).  This 
type of situation can be devised by the companies themselves, or orchestrated by corrupt 
contracting officials. 
In the United States, contracts that are awarded using competitive procedures but where 
only one offer is received are a specific area of concern. In these cases contracts are recorded as 
competitive contracts when they actually were non-competitive (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). This is important because the federal acquisition regulation 
(FAR) does not require cost and pricing data from the contractor if competition exists. If 
non-competitive awards are incorrectly labeled as competitive, then there is a good 
chance for corruption because, contractors have the opportunity to submit inflated prices 
(Klaes W. Wandland, 1993).   
40 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter discusses the significant corruption risks related to offset 
arrangements and single-source contracting methods, which are widely-used in defense 
acquisitions programs. The following chapter focuses on the vulnerabilities of these 
arrangements by analyzing specific cases from different acquisition programs. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING TRANSPARENCY AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION PRACTICES IN DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT 
A. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING TOOLS 
1. Introduction 
Appreciating the nature and extent of corruption is crucial to formulating, 
implementing, and assessing strategies to combat corruption (McCusker, 2006). There 
are state-level and transnational approaches to combating corruption. This chapter 
provides an overview of current tools, and strategies to combat corruption. Chapter 
questions that we attempt to answer include:  
 What are the relevant strategies, mechanisms, tools and international efforts 
utilized in defense environments (both by governments and defense business 
companies) to fight against corruption? 
Within this framing question the chapter will address the following sub- question: 
 What are the specific strategies of the worlds’ biggest defense establishments, 
NATO, and the USA?  
These two questions will establish to the basis for a discussion about the 
effectiveness of current tools used to fight against corruption in the defense industry. 
Measuring and preventing corruption is not an obvious process. Corruption is a 
complex, ambiguous phenomenon. It occurs in secret and takes a variety of forms, 
ranging from petty abuses to major political scandals (Reiling, 2009, p. 7). Furthermore, 
the patterns of corruption vary over time and from society to society. In order to 
understand the immense diversity of corruption’s origins, forms and effects on countries, 
the roles of the internal and external stakeholders should be examined (Doig, Riley, 2007, 
pg.1).  
There are different types of corruption in defense. Measures to address the risks of 
corruption will be effective only where there is an understanding of which particular 
aspect of the problem is being addressed (NATO Integrity Self-Assessment Tool, Pg.4).  
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Countering corruption, particularly in defense and security establishments, is a multi-
faceted process with many steps, layers, and potential pitfalls (Transparency 
International). The tools and methods utilized should be tailored to track these variables 
and propose applicable solutions within the changing social environment of corruption 
(Doig, Riley, 2007, pg.1).  However, there is no single rule or model applicable to 
control, accountability and transparency in the defense procurement process. Every 
country develops its own unique approach and manner to manage and control defense 
procurement (Tagarev, Transparency in Defence Policy, Military Budgeting and 
Procurement, 2002, pp. 49–50).  
Attempting to implement a one-size fits all strategy to fight corruption is unlikely 
to be successful. There are no clearly delineated solutions to corruption, but there are a 
number of ways to mitigate the effects of corruption. (McCusker, 2006) 
In addition to the efforts of government and non-governmental organizations, 
many defense companies now “(address) the issue more directly than they did during the 
days of Cold War. The changing legal environment, including the anti-bribery convention 
of the OECD, has generated the conditions for this shift. The defense industry and 
governments have been increasingly interested in implementing anti-corruption policies 
in both national and international defense environments. (Rousseau, 2010) Exporting 
governments, importing governments, and defense companies are introducing 
mechanisms, such as Integrity Pacts, for greater transparency and accountability in 
defense procurement. Some of these tools include civilian oversight of defense 
procurement (Fernandez, 2011). Additionally, states belonging to the United Nations are 
currently negotiating a treaty to regulate the arms trade by 2012. Anti-corruption 
provisions will be an important part of the treaty.  
2. Mechanisms, Tools, and International Efforts 
At its June 2008 meeting in Vienna, The UN Global Compact group agreed to 
develop an online Anti-Corruption Tools Inventory. The inventory consists of basic 
frameworks that companies and governments may use to protect themselves from 
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corruption. Transparency International’s Defense and Security Program (TI DSP) has 
also developed tools to navigate and counter the corruption process and collaborate with 
interested parties. Most of the measures recommended in these tools fulfill four main 
complementary functions of repression, detection, prevention in a repression perspective 
and prevention in an incentives perspective. Certain instruments also address the private 
sector and assist companies in undertaking measures to prevent corruption in their 
internal organizations (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003). 
The relationship between the governments and the private business sector is very 
close at the level of defense acquisitions; therefore it would be beneficial to examine the 
tools and practices available for both the private sector and governments simultaneously. 
The tools can be categorized under the titles as below: 
a. Anti-Corruption Conventions 
The conventions are “written international agreements between groups of 
countries that recognize corruption as a worldwide and cross-border problem, and express 
a shared political commitment to addressing the problem” (Business Anti-Corruption 
Portal, 2011). These international treaties are “designed to fill gaps in existing anti-
corruption laws.” (Heinemann, 2006, s. 79) These conventions are increasingly important 
in today’s global environment; states and private actors are increasingly interconnected 
through travel, new forms of communication, trade and investing. They are binding 
instruments—once signed and ratified, they become compulsory to uphold, and they 
provide a framework for addressing cross-border issues. The most significant of these 
conventions are as follows (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
(1) OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The OECD Convention 
on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention) is the most focused of the major anti-corruption conventions. Its aim is “to 
address the supply side of bribery by covering a group of countries accounting for the 
majority of global exports and foreign investment” (Transparency International). The 
Convention deals with “active corruption” or “active bribery,” which is the act of offering 
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a bribe, as opposed to “passive bribery,” which is the act of receiving bribes.  
Additionally, this convention seeks to assure a functional equivalence among the 
measures taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011, p. 14). The Preamble of the 
Convention emphasizes the bribery phenomenon and its undermining effects on 
governments and economic development, while also highlighting the shared 
responsibility of countries to combat bribery in the international business arena 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011). 
The Convention requires ratifying members to establish a criminal 
offence article under its law.  This would prevent foreign public officials from being 
bribed to obtain or retain business or other unlawful, improper benefits in the conduct of 
international business (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2011). The scope of the convention can be regarded as narrow, but it is significantly 
important because the 36 signatory countries own most of the multi-national 
corporations. (Heinemann, 2006, s. 80) 
The 3rd article of the Convention, which defines the “Sanctions,” 
stresses the importance of effectively, proportionately, and persuasively punishing 
bribery of a foreign public official. Guilty parties should be extradited and deprived of 
liberty. If individuals are not considered criminally responsible under a party’s legal 
system, effective non-criminal sanctions must be ensured. In addition, the proceeds of the 
bribery should be seized, and each party should consider additional civil or administrative 
sanctions upon the responsible individuals. 
The Convention also agreed that the investigation and prosecution 
of a foreign public official’s bribery should not be influenced by national economic 
interests, the investigation’s effect on international relationships, or the identity of the 
individuals involved.  
The 8th article of the Convention requires each ratified member to 
focus on the standards of accounting and auditing records.  The aim of this article is to 
sustain full disclosure of financial statements in order to prevent off-the-books accounts. 
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(2) UN Convention against Corruption. The UNCAC and the 
Anti-Bribery Convention are mutually supportive. However, among various international 
conventions, the UN Convention against Corruption “is by far the broadest of any of the 
international anticorruption conventions to date” (Yukins, 2006). This document has the 
potential to serve as a truly global framework since 140 signatories are a mixture of 
developed and developing countries. Additionally, it covers a broader scope of issues 
related with both domestic and foreign corruption, and offers a wide range of preventive 
measures as establishment of anti-corruption agencies and legal assistance between 
states. (Heinemann, 2006, s. 81) “It covers a wide range of offences, including domestic 
and foreign bribery, embezzlement, trading influence, as well as the concealment and 
laundering of the proceeds of corruption” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). The 
Convention contains provisions for detecting and sanctioning corruption; it also requires 
signatory states to implement measures and criminalize corruption in their public sectors 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011).  
Articles 5 through 15 of the Convention commit each signatory 
state to the development and maintenance of effective, coordinated anti-corruption 
policies. 
Following Article 6 requires enacting states to establish ‘anti-corruption 
bodies’ to implement and tout anti-corruption policies. Article 7 requires 
civil servants to be paid adequately and promoted on merit, and state 
parties are to ‘maintain and strengthen systems and prevent conflicts of 
interest.(Yukins, 2006).  
Articles 8 through10 asks parties to establish codes of conduct for 
their public officials, set procurement standards, and provide greater transparency in 
public administration. Articles 12 and 13 deal with reducing corruption in the private 
sector, and call for the enhancement of public participation in the anti-corruption efforts 
(Yukins, 2006, p. 189).  
Following articles 15 through 42 addresses criminalization and law 
enforcement efforts, articles 43 through 50 includes detailed requirements for 
international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting corruption. Articles 51 through 
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59 deals with asset recovery calling for international cooperation in identifying and 
seizing assets tainted by corruption, articles 60 through 62 includes international training 
and information exchange efforts.  (Yukins, 2006, pp. 190–191) 
One main weakness of the UNCAC was the lack of an effective 
review mechanism to evaluate signatory members’ degree of implementation of the 
Convention. In 2009, however, the Conference of the State Parties to the UNCAC agreed 
on such a mechanism, although only on a voluntary basis (Global Advice Network). 
Additionally, the Convention does not adequately address a recurring danger in public 
procurement: the “revolving door.” As government officials move into the private sector, 
and their private counterparts enter government, there is a pronounced risk that 
procurement decisions inside the government will be corrupted by past relationships—or 
by future job opportunities (Yukins, 2006, pp. 198–199). 
(3) Inter- American Convention against Corruption. The Inter-
American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) is the first international judicial instrument dedicated to fighting corruption. 
The Convention obliges State Parties to implement measures related to their judicial 
systems and public policies. These measures aim to promote the development 
mechanisms to prevent, detect, prosecute, and eradicate corruption as well as to promote, 
facilitate, and regulate cooperation between State Parties on these matters (Transparency 
International).  
The Convention Action Plan predominantly suggests establishing 
general transparency of public administrations, and developing priorities for achieving 
such transparency (Sutton, 1996, s. 1455).  In order to take full advantage of this 
transparency, this convention urges the protection of whistle-blowers, the creation of 
official oversight bodies, most importantly, the oversight by a civil organizations. 
(Sutton, 1996, s. 1459–1460). The Convention attacks individual acts of corruption, and 
systems that permit such acts to flourish.  In response, the convention promotes 
cooperation between states in order to curb corruption by through state-level and 
transnational approaches (Sutton, 1996, s. 1457).  
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On a smaller level, the convention focuses on measures to ensure public oversight of 
government functions by addressing conflicts of interests among public employees, and 
also tracks any illicit enrichment of individuals (Sutton, 1996, p. 1455). 
Beyond the general terms of anti-corruption, the Convention offers 
specific articles on transparency during the acquisition of conventional weapons.  The 
objective of these articles is to provide regional transparency by exchanging information 
regarding such acquisitions (Organization of American States, 2010). The convention 
requires parties to annually report detailed information about their imports and exports of 
conventional weapons to the depositary: the General Secretariat of the Organization of 
American States. In addition to these annual reports, parties are also required to notify the 
depositary with the information of arms acquisition through imports or through national 
production.  
(4) Council of Europe Conventions. The Council of Europe has 
implemented two important policies to fight corruption. In 1998, the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption was adopted as a regional consensus on how states should 
address criminalization and international cooperation in the area of corruption (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). This convention covers public and private sector 
corruption. It deals with broad range of corruption offences as active and passive bribery 
of public officials, trading in influence, money laundering and accounting crimes. 
(Argandoña, 2007, s. 483) Additionally, “it also requires signatory countries to establish 
the liability of corporate entities for acts of corruption committed by their employees or 
agents” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
The Civil Law Convention on Corruption was adopted in 
November 1999, and it was “the first attempt to define common international rules in the 
field of civil law and corruption” (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 2006) “Its 
signers are obliged to authorize civil actions for compensation of firms damaged by 
corrupt practices.” (Carrington, 2007) 
(5) African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption. The African Union has taken a bold step towards immunizing Africa against 
the pandemic of corruption (Udombana, 2003, s. 447). The AU Convention on 
48 
 
Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted by the heads of state at the African 
Union Summit held in Maputo on July 11, 2003. The Convention was an attempt to 
develop international law addressing corruption in Africa (there was no existing 
international law) (Udombana, 2003). 
The AU Convention has provided a comprehensive framework and 
covered a range of criminal offences including bribery (domestic or foreign), diversion of 
property by public officials, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, money laundering, 
and concealment of property (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). The convention 
generated measures for prevention, criminalization, regional cooperation, mutual legal 
assistance and recovery of assets. Public and private sectors are both addressed in this 
convention, as well as both the supplying and demanding sides of corruption. The 
convention provides unique, mandatory provisions of private-to-private corruption and 
transparency in political party funding (Transparency International). 
b. Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Integrity Systems from Select 
Countries 
(1) Anti-Corruption Handbook for the Norwegian Business 
Sector. This handbook has several purposes: to make companies aware of how 
Norwegian and international legislation addresses corruption, to encourage management 
to raise awareness amongst its employees about corruption, to spread awareness of 
methods for dealing with gifts, hospitality, bribery, conflicts of interest, tax issues and 
facilitation payments, and to advise companies on establishing mechanisms to reduce 
corruption at home and abroad (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). It also provides 
key recommendations for the procurement of goods and services from suppliers 
(Transparency International Norway, 2009). For implementation, guidance requires 
commitment from top management, risk mapping, organizational involvement, written 
policies and standards, training programs, internal controls and auditing and whistle 




(2) Business Unity South Africa Anti-Corruption (BUSA) 
Guide for South African Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). This guide was 
developed by BUSA with support from the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) in August, 2009. BUSA aims to ensure that business plays a constructive role in 
South Africa’s economic growth, development and transformation and to provide a 
competitive environment in which businesses of all sizes and in all sectors can thrive and 
expand. (Business Unity South Africa, 2005)  
(3) Business without Corruption (Russia) - An Action Guide. 
This guide was produced by the Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) 
Foundation and the All-Russian Non-Governmental Organization of Small and Medium-
Sized Business (OPORA in Russian), with support from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE) (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
The objective of this brochure was to support small business 
owners in Russia with tools to resist corruption and to provide them with strategies to 
survive and grow in an excessively aggressive environment. (The INDEM Foundation) 
After an assessment of the corruption level in Russian business environment between 
2001 and 2005, the document continues with a focus on bureaucratic corruption and 
highlights the importance of civil society institutions to protect businesspeople. (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) 
(4) Confronting Corruption - The Business Case for an 
Effective Global Anti-Corruption Program. This report was developed by a global 
professional services firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), in 2008. PwC’s Confronting 
Corruption report examines to the current efforts of companies to manage the risk of 
corruption, and advises them how to better protect themselves in the future (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). This analysis aims to provide a road map for 
implementing effective anti-corruption programs. The quantitative findings of this report 




(5) Federation of German Industries (BDI) - Preventing 
Corruption. The “Preventing Corruption - BDI Recommendations” provides information 
to companies about the international legal anti-corruption efforts, and puts emphasis on 
the importance of CEO’s and senior management approach to corruption in their 
business. The organization offers nine principles to guide the preparation and 
enhancement of codes of conduct and internal organizational measures (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2011). 
These principles include strict compliance with laws and other 
regulations at home and abroad, exemplary behavior of corporate management, fair 
dealings with suppliers and customers, restrictions on gifts and remunerations, separation 
between business and private expenditures, regulations about engagement of business 
partners for private purposes, conflicts of interest arising from outside professional 
commitments or capital interests, engagement of agents, and donations to political parties 
and politicians (BDI- Federation of German Industries, 2007, s. 7–8). 
(6) French Business Confederation Brochure on Preventing 
Corruption. Similar to previous country examples, the French Business Confederation 
MEDEF’s brochure targets its internationally active business corporations. The document 
provides explanations about different forms of corruption, and information about the 
legal responsibilities enforced by the OECD Convention and the French anti-corruption 
laws. In a specific focus, key questions raised and vulnerabilities addressed regarding to 
the use of agents in business transactions. (The Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee, 2010) 
c. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Tools for Self-
Regulation 
“The ICC Rules of Conduct are intended to serve as a method for 
voluntary self-regulation by business against the background of applicable national laws” 
(International Chamber of Commerce, 2005).  
These rules are a general summary of good commercial practices. This 
source aims to assist companies in fulfilling their legal obligations so that they comply 
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with anti-corruption initiatives at the international level. However, these rules do not 
carry any legal weight (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). The report covers the 
prohibition of bribery and extortion, agents and other intermediaries, joint ventures and 
outsourcing agreements, political and charitable contributions and sponsorships, gifts, 
hospitality and expenses, facilitation payments, corporate policies, and financial 
recording and auditing, and responsibilities (International Chamber of Commerce, 2005).  
d. OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Investors in Weak Governance 
Zones 
The tool aims to provide a supportive document and guidance for the 
companies that invest in WGZs, “where governments are unwilling or unable to assume 
their full responsibilities.” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) This resource 
addresses the risks and ethical dilemmas that are common in these regions, and 
recommends “ obeying the law and observing international instruments, heightened care 
in managing investments, checking business partners and clients and dealing with public 
sector officials, and speaking out against malpractices.” (OECD, 2006) 
e. Reform Toolkit - Combating Corruption: A Private Sector 
Approach 
This toolkit was developed by the CIPE and the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) in 2008. It provides important concepts regarding the underlying 
causes of corruption; it also suggests concrete suggestions that private sectors can reform 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). The toolkit includes explanations of the costs 
and causes of corruption, stages in the fight against corruption, the demand-side and 
supply-side methods of fighting corruption, and case studies of anti-corruption programs 
in Bulgaria, Colombia, and Serbia (Center for International Private Enterprise, 2011). 
f. Transparency International Business Principles for Countering 
Bribery 
The Transparency International Business Principles offers a guide for 
companies to develop their institutional anti-bribery programs. In the same context, the 
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document refers to the importance of external verification of these anti-bribery systems to 
assure their effectiveness and value addition to the corporation.  
This document focuses on the development of programs for countering 
bribery taking the form of political contributions, charitable contributions and 
sponsorships, facilitation payments, gifts, hospitality, and expenses. Additionally, it 
describes the requirements of program implementation by emphasizing the importance of 
business relationships, human resources, training, raising concerns and seeking guidance, 
communication, internal controls and record keeping, monitoring, and review and 
external verification and assurance. (Transparency International, 2009) 
g. Voluntary Anti-Corruption Principles 
(1) Global Compact Principle 10. The Global Compact is a 
voluntary international initiative developed by UN. It promotes companies to embrace, 
support and enact core values in the areas of human rights, labor standards, environment 
and anti-corruption. These core values are required for corporations to be part of the 
solution to the challenges of globalization. (UN Global Compact Office, 2011)  
The 10th principle (“Businesses should work against corruption in 
all its forms, including extortion and bribery”) is a specific focus on addressing the fight 
against corruption. It requires a holistic approach from the participants to successfully 
resolve and address this problem.  
(2)  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. “The 
guidelines are recommendations addressed by governments for multinational 
enterprises.” (OECD, 2008) An updated format of these guidelines are released in 2011 
covering major issues about combating bribery, bribe solicitation and extortion, due 
diligence and competition. The document refers to the intense competition and variety of 
legal and social responsibilities in the business environment of multinational companies. 
Further, it addresses the risks of neglecting these rules, and attempting to gain 
uncompetitive advantage. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding 
activities to protect whistle-blowers reporting negative practices that are contravening the 
law. (OECD, 2011)  
53 
 
(3) Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI). PACI is a 
global initiative developed by companies to serve companies in the fight against 
corruption. All companies are invited “to join PACI regardless of their size, country of 
origin or affiliation with the World Economic Forum” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 
2011). It is a collective action which aims to allow companies’ to benchmark their 
internal practices against global best practices (World Economic Forum, 2011).   
In 2011, as a product of a joint study with TI, ICC and UN Global 
Compact they published an important document about resisting extortion and solicitation 
in international transactions. This document was designed as a training tool based on real-
life scenarios and cases. Its primary intention was to raise awareness about bribe 
solicitation, and provide practical guidance for employers how to respond in case of 
similar inappropriate demands (World Economic Forum, ICC, TI and UN Global 
Compact , 2011).  
h. Corruption Cases and Court Rulings 
(1) Cases under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. These 
publications provide a parallel knowledge about actual enforcement activities under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the U.S.. These cases and court rulings are 
valuable resources to follow current U.S. foreign bribery proceedings, and reveal the 
trends and patterns in FCPA enforcement. (Shearman & Stealing LLP, 2011)  
(2) UNICORN - Bribery Cases. United against Corruption 
(UNICORN) is in close relationship with trade unions around the world. Their purpose is 
to raise awareness about existing anti-corruption instruments, provide protection for 
whistle-blowers and support cooperating trade unions in their fight against corruption 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) Their website provide external reports, 
resolutions and statements, briefings, bribery cases and whistleblower cases covering 
fraud and corruption issues. Further, they provide sectoral indices including the defense 
sector which summarizes defense related bribery investigations and corruption cases from 
all around the world (UNICORN, 2011). 
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i. Country Specific Information 
(1) Business Anti-Corruption Portal Country Profiles. This 
portal covers 62 developing country profiles containing information about different types 
of corruption that companies may encounter in different countries. The portal provides 
general information about each country and then supplements this information with 
specific sectoral data and findings of quantitative country surveys on corruption. 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) Country files include sector descriptions with 
related corruption types, levels of corruption in these sectors under the titles of 
individual, business and political. Provided country-specific information is collected 
through publicly available (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011).    
(2) Business Fighting Corruption - Country Resources. 
Business fighting corruption is a 2008 initiative of World Bank Institute. The initiative 
calls for a “collective action” for business partners and stakeholders. Their portal is an 
interactive and business-oriented web source designed to provide tailored tools for the 
use of corporations and their stakeholders. The website lets users to share their 
experience and knowledge for the benefit of other users. The portal also includes business 
cases, a collective action guide, country profiles and sector specific resources (Business 
Fighting Corruption, 2008).  
(3) Global Integrity Country Reports. The Global Integrity 
Report started serves as a tool to understand governance and anti-corruption mechanisms 
at national levels. It is prepared by journalists, local researchers and academics to give 
policymakers and citizens of nations a set of important information to debate on (The 
Global Integrity, 2011). 
Country reports mainly assess the existence, effectiveness and 
citizen access to governance and anti-corruption mechanisms. Further, they include 
comparisons between the existing legal framework of countries and the realities about the 
implementation of these regulations. (The Global Integrity, 2011) The reports particular 
focus is on the transparency of the “public procurement process, media freedom, asset 




j. Due Diligence 
This element illustrates particular situations in which companies 
should be alert to corruption. A systemized strategy towards standard business procedures 
may significantly reduce the risk of being subject to corrupt practices (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2011). 
(1) Agent Screening Process. This evaluation procedure has 
been particularly devised for SMEs that are planning to use agents to enter new markets. 
The procedure requires an active business code of conduct for corruption and bribery. 
This procedure can help SMEs to minimize the problems related with corrupt agents and 
secure their business plans in the target country. In case SMEs plan to outsource this 
evaluation procedure, they may use this screening guideline as a reference document 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
(2) Consultant Evaluation Process. This process was developed 
for companies planning to use consultants to conduct business in a foreign country or 
region. It proposes a framework for proper selection of consultants and about their 
contract renewals. The purpose of this procedure is to minimize the problems related to 
corrupt consultants by focusing on business codes of conduct for corruption and bribery. 
This process is expected to reduce the overall risk associated with conducting business in 
another country, or region (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011).  
(3) Joint Venture Consortium. This procedure has been 
developed for companies planning to enter into a partnership, joint venture, or 
consortium. The procedure is based on an active business Code of Conduct for corruption 
and bribery. Expectations from this procedure are to minimize the problems resulted from 
corrupt partners, and reduce the risk of doing a joint business in target countries 
(Business Anti-corruption Portal, 2011). 
(4) Contractor procedure. This is a handy tool to determine 
corruption risks related with a contracting activity. This procedure is intended to identify 
the gaps in which bribery can potentially occur in the phases of the initial offer, the 
contract negotiation, the signing of the contract, and the execution of the delivery 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011).  
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(5) Public Procurement Due Diligence Tool. Public 
procurement is a high-risk area for SMEs because corrupt actions put companies under 
the risks of blacklisting, extortion and legal prosecution. Additionally, they can be 
banned from submitting bids on lucrative contracts which are crucial to their existence in 
the business (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011).  
The tool includes three documents and an interactive tool to help 
assessing corruption risks in a specific instance of public procurement. The guidance 
documents describe the overall principles, the procedure document provides the 
evaluation matrix and the risk assessment document includes the questions posed for the 
phases of public  procurement. The interactive tool helps to determine risks arising from 
procedural steps and generates a risk profile from the given answers. (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2011) 
k. Grey Areas 
(1) Crossing the Line - on Gifts, Hospitality and Expenses. 
“The challenge of developing an operational definition of corruption takes companies 
into “grey areas” where the boundaries between right and wrong are not clearly drawn.” 
(Kathyrn Gordon, 2003) In business relations, gifts and hospitality are often considered 
the “grey areas” between corruption and appropriate relationship building (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2011). 
This tool is developed by Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
to clarify what is legal in regards to offer and receive gifts and manage hospitality and 
expenses (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise , 2006) . 
l. Reporting 
(1) Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle against 
Corruption. This is the most succinct, practical guide, regarding anti-corruption practices, 




It equips businesses with the practical means to report anti-corruption policies 
comprehensively and effectively; public reporting strongly signals to employees, 
investors and consumers that a company is serious about clean business (Business Anti-
Corrption Portal , 2011). 
(2) Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines. The GRI creates a 
framework for organizations of all sizes to measure and report their economic, 
environmental, and social performance. Sustainability reports based on the GRI 
framework can be used to benchmark organizational performance concerning laws, 
norms, codes, performance standards and voluntary initiatives.  It can also be used to 
demonstrate a commitment to sustainable development and transparency (Business Anti-
Corrption Portal , 2011). 
m. Sector-Specific Anti-Corruption Resources (Defense Sector) 
(1) Common Industry Standards (CIS) for the European 
Aerospace and Defense Industries (ASD). The ASD Common Industry Standards is a 
voluntary code adopted by member companies to 32 National Trade Associations in 21 
European countries.” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) Main objective of the 
standards is to enhance the competitive development of Aerospace industry free of 
corruption, and allow all participants a level ground to compete on fair bases.” The 
standards cover issues which include compliance with laws and regulations, gifts and 
hospitality, political donations and contributions, and dealing with agents, consultants 
and intermediaries. (Advancing UK AeroSpace, Defence & Security Industries, 2009) 
The standards strives “to avoid all forms of direct and indirect corruption by encourage 
agents, consultants and business partners to comply with integrity standards (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
n. Training 
(1) Business Anti-Corruption Portal Basic Training 
Development. This training procedure was developed as an integrated part of a larger 
integrity system program prepared by the Global Advice Network. It was devised for 
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companies that have adopted an active business policy concerning corruption and bribery. 
Training is a key part of the program; the type of training is tailored to the company’s 
needs, which are identified through the assessment of a company’s existing skills, 
knowledge, and the capacity for employees and business partners (Business Anti-
Corruption Portal, 2006). 
(2) Defense Leadership in Building Integrity Course. This 
course is provided by TI UK’s International Defense & Security Program. It aims to 
strengthen foundations, within the defense and security sector, for leadership, integrity, 
good governance and countering corruption.  Emphasis is placed on open communication 
and the relationships between participants, staff and speakers.  A cross-cultural 
examination on the topic of corruption in the defense sphere is also provided, which 
advances the ability to implement a nation’s counter-corruption mechanisms. 
(Transparency International) 
o. Whistleblowing 
(1) ICC Guidelines on Whistle-blowing. The whistle-blowing 
system is essential to the integrity programs implemented by companies seeking to 
comply with anti-corruption efforts. The ICC Guidelines on whistle blowing provide 
practical tools that allow companies to establish internal whistle-blowing mechanisms 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
(2) Public Concern at Work Whistle-blowing (PcAW) 
Assistance . PCaW is an independent authority whistle-blowing for the sake of public 
interests. (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) It promotes the responsibility of 
individuals and organizations. (Public Concern at Work, 2003) It also offers professional 
support for whistle-blowers, and educates organizations about this critical issue (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
p. Leadership Workshop & Days 
According to TI’s Security and Defense Program, leaders must be visibly 
committed to reform. Leaders must be strong role models for ethical behavior. They must 
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be able to successfully persuade officers, officials, and the public that change is 
necessary, and spread knowledge about corruption through education and training. 
Leaders must also be open to third parties like defense companies and civil society. 
(Transparency International)  
There are several ways to engage with key leaders in defense area: 
(1) Leadership Workshops & Leaders’ Days. Leaders’ Days, 
which brings civil and military leaders together to exchange ideas, highlights corruption 
vulnerabilities and fosters the discussion of tools and solutions. These events help leaders 
develop a common understanding of corruption and the risks it poses to their countries. 
These events encourage confidence through an open discussion on corruption. 
(Transparency International)  
(2) Roundtables. Roundtable organizations are generally half-
day events that host senior defense ministry or Presidency officials, procurement 
officials, Members of Parliament, Ambassadors, defense companies, and the media. 
Major procurements or defense scandals often create the impetus to organize a roundtable 
in order to discuss the issue of corruption in the defense sector. (Transparency 
International, 2011) 
q. Anti-Corruption Plans 
“Tackling corruption in defense and security is a process that requires the 
diagnosis of specific problems and the engagement of officers, officials and 
stakeholders.” (Transparency International, 2011) A remedial plan is necessary for 
coordinating and managing integrity-building measures. A good anti-corruption strategy 
contains clearly-defined steps for building integrity and reducing corruption. The first 
step is of the calculation of strengths and vulnerabilities, which areas in need of reform 
and an appropriate strategy. An anti-corruption plan needs specific time-frames and 
milestones; progress should be reported regularly to an overseeing group. Most 
importantly, there should be a mechanism for monitoring progress and results. Possible 
mechanisms include public surveys, employee surveys, external reviews, and media 
scrutiny. (Transparency International, 2011) 
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r. Defense Integrity Pacts 
Defense Integrity Pacts combat corruption at the tendering and contract 
stages of procurement. They bind bidders and the government together in a contract; this 
reduces the possibility of corruption occurring during and after the tendering stage. 
(Transparency International, 2011) 
Integrity Pacts supplement weak laws with contractual requirements. 
Additionally, the contracts attract more bidders when there a fair playing field and 
independent, technical scrutiny are both present. These pacts encourage confidence in 
bidders through their visible effort at maintaining a “clean” procurement process; these 
pacts require independent monitors and the extensive probity of government. These pacts 
reduce the costs of contracts and supplement inefficient enforcement by reinforcing 
sanctions. They also enforce strong penalties, forcing companies that engage in corrupt 
behavior to withdraw from bids. (Transparency International, 2011)  
Integrity pacts are applicable during the tendering stage, rather than after 
the awarding stage, and can sometimes provide independent assurance throughout the 
execution phase of the contract as well. Because the defense procurement process often 
has a poor reputation of being subject to political influence, integrity pacts may 
strengthen public confidence. (Ben Magahy D. S., 2009) 
However, Integrity Pacts are not a solution; they do not address structural 
or legal issues such as the reform of the procurement process.  Additionally, these pacts 
can be rendered ineffective in the absence of a credible Independent Monitor. Integrity 
pacts must not be reduced to an administrative procedure; they must be supported from 
the top of the defense ministry in order to be effective in the national strategy against 
corruption. 
s. Independent Monitors 
Independent Monitors are appointed by the government to oversee the 
defense integrity pact process. It is essential that the Monitor’s independence is not 
compromised by the nature of the appointment. Independent Monitors should not be 
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government employees; they should be familiar with the language and culture of the 
country to which they are appointed; they should understand the defense procurement 
process; and they should be available for an indefinite amount of time because of the 
extensive length of some contracts. The role of monitors must be clear: they are formally 
independent, obligated to publish all findings, and they may not be reprimanded by the 
government for any negative claims. (Transparency International, 2011) 
B. NATO ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES, EFFORTS 
1. NATO Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-
DIB) 
NATO’s Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building includes ten 
objectives and numerous courses of action in different areas—from parliamentarian 
control and oversight to organizational management, financial planning or international 
affairs.  This initiative aggregates most of these domains into a single, comprehensive 
approach to defense reform. (Bucur-Marcu, 2010, p. 2) This initiative stresses the need to 
formulate and implement security and defense policies in a transparent and responsible 
manner.  
The NATO PAP-DIP enterprise endeavors to help nations building defense 
institutions. This enterprise assists nations in analyzing their development of 
democratically responsible defense institutions, such as the armed forces. (Bucur-Marcu, 
2010, p. 1) The initiative was not designed as a new plan of defense or security sector 
reform, but rather as a prerequisite for adjusting existing sectors so that they are more 
effective within a democratic framework. (Bucur-Marcu, 2010, p. 2) 
As a NATO partnership initiative, PAP-DIB does not have any tools to implement 
programs; its aim is to benefit the existing tools and mechanisms of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace, including the Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) 
(Bucur-Marcu, 2010, p. 3) 
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2. Integrity Self-Assessment Process 
The Integrity Self-Assessment Process has been developed within the NATO 
Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB). It is focused on 
practical support for nations, helping their defense reform efforts, as well as helping 
nations meet their international obligations within the United Nations framework.  
The process begins with a detailed questionnaire for senior members of national 
defense ministries. Based on this questionnaire, a draft report is produced by an expert 
team, consisting of national and international experts. The draft report is followed by a 
visit from the expert team, which includes in-depth interviews with relevant figures in the 
defense establishments before submitting a final report. The document contains a set of 
questions that cover all the key topics relevant to building integrity and reducing 
corruption: Democratic control and engagement, national anti-corruption laws and 
policies, anti-corruption policies in defense and security, personnel (behavior, policy, 
training, discipline), planning and budgeting, operations, procurement, engaging with 
defense companies and other suppliers, nation-specific questions. (Transparency 
International) 
3. Compendium of Best Pratices in Building Integrity and Reducing 
Corruption Risk in Defence 
The compendium details national and international history of fighting corruption.  
This compilation presents the foundations of a strategic approach to reducing corruption 
risks in defense. The approach combines efforts to build integrity, increase transparency, 
and improve accountability in defense institutions. Such a combination increases the 
moral burden of corrupt behavior, reduces perceived rewards, and increases punishment. 
(Tagarev, Enabling Factors and Effects of Corruption in the Defense, 2010) 
In more detail, the compendium also examines the sources and reasons for 
corruption in defense. The best practices of building integrity and enhancing transparency 
and accountability are also examined, including the areas of personnel policies and 
manpower management, defense budgeting and financial management, procurement, 
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offset arrangements, outsourcing, privatization, public-private partnerships in defense, 
utilization of surplus equipment and infrastructure, the involvement of defense personnel 
and assets in economic activities. 
Finally, the compendium presents details on relevant regulatory frameworks and 
approaches demonstrated to assist in building integrity at the level of individuals, 
executive branches of government (and the defense ministry in particular), parliaments 
and audit offices, ombudsman institutions, the defense industry, civil society, the media, 
and international organizations. 
4. Training Module in Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk 
The aim of this training module is to educate military and civilian personnel about 
the risk of corruption in the security sector. This training is specifically intended for 
personnel possessing the rank of full colonel, or an equivalent civilian grade level. The 
module focuses on how to strengthen integrity and reduce corruption in defense, and how 
to support transparency and good governance. Additionally, the module discusses how 
officials should engage with the public and civil society. 
5. NATO/ISAF Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance 
NATO/ISAF has developed the COIN contracting guide to streamline the 
contracting efforts in Afghanistan.  These efforts significantly impact contracting policy 
and, and has nonlethal impacts on the battlefield in Afghanistan. (Center, 2011) This 
guide reviews the huge scale of contracting activities in Afghanistan, and the opportunity 
and danger that is associated with these activities. With this objective, the COIN 
guidance aims to prevent large quantities of international funds from reaching corrupt 
hands.  It also aims to finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal, dark 
networks, and undermine ISAF’s campaign objectives. 
The guidance recognizes the role contracting plays in countering insurgencies; 
that to see how contracts with Afghan firms procuring Afghan goods and services 
generate employment and assist the development of a sustainable economy. (Petraeus, 
2010) Additionally, the guidance endorses contracts that lead to the hiring of Afghan 
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workers and Afghan owned-companies; when this is not possible, it encourages 
companies to hire Afghans and sub-contract with responsible Afghan firms. (Petraeus, 
2010) Purchases from Afghans should minimize damage to existing economic systems 
and catalyze the expansion of the host nation’s economy. “Job training, joint ventures, 
and creation of new businesses frustrate an insurgency’s recruitment efforts and decrease 
its influence on the local population.” (Center, 2011)  
The COIN guidance requires the Regional Contracting Centers (RCCs) to 
establish systems and standard databases that are available to vendors and contractors to 
help them ensure they are not empowering the wrong people. To “contract with vendors 
that have fewer sub-contractors to prevent providing opportunities for criminal networks 
and insurgents to divert contract money from its’ intended purpose.” (Petraeus, 2010) 
Additionally, planning ahead of contracts, establishing reasonable timelines, and ensuring 
transparency and oversight, integrating contracting into intelligence, plans, and 
operations, consulting and involving local leaders in the contracting activities, developing 
new partnerships with a broader range of Afghan companies are seen core to accomplish 
and improve desired contracting while serving the campaign objectives.   
C. U.S ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES ON DEFENCE 
PROCUREMENT 
1. General Law on Bribery and Corruption 
Under U.S. law, foreign and domestic bribery falls under several distinct 
federal and individual state criminal statutes. Generally, the prohibited 
conduct involves paying, attempting or promising to pay, U.S. or non-U.S. 
government officials improperly to influence their official acts, or, in the 
private context, causing an employee or agent of a company to act in a 
way contrary to the interests of their employer. U.S. federal laws prohibit 
bribery of both domestic U.S. and non-U.S. government officials. In 
addition, individual state laws make it a crime to bribe domestic state and 
local officials. (Woolf Committee, 2008) 
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2. U.S. Federal Law on Bribery and Corruption (The U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act) 
U.S. federal law prohibits bribery of both non-U.S. and domestic federal public 
officials. The U.S. federal anti-foreign bribery statute is the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act 1977. The FCPA applies to U.S. persons and companies; any stockholder, officer, 
director, employee, or agent acting on behalf of a U.S. company; and any company that 
has a class of securities registered or that is required to file reports pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The FCPA can also apply to any non-U.S. company or 
individual if prohibited acts are enacted within the United States (Woolf Committee, 
2008). 
The FCPA adopts a strategy of combining criminal as well as regulatory 
approaches to the corruption cases. It targets individuals and corporations in the fight 
against corruption. The FCPA criminalizes corrupt payments made to any foreign 
official, which are paid by any agent of a publicly-held U.S. corporation, or individual 
citizens, nationals, or residents of United States who do not hold public offices. (Sutton, 
1996, p. 1468) The FCPA also enforces accurate bookkeeping practices in order to ensure 
that entities participating in the U.S. stock market have measures to prevent corrupt 
payments to foreign officials. (Sutton, 1996, p. 1469) Finally, the FCPA deliberately 
exempts the most pervasive form of corrupt payments: the facilitating payment. 
The FCPA’s penalties for violations of anti-bribery and corruption provisions are 
severe. For criminal convictions, companies more than $2 million for each violation, or 
twice the amount earned through conduct that violates the FCPA. In addition, individuals 
can be imprisoned for up to five years. For civil violations, penalties of $10,000 for each 
violation may be imposed on companies and individuals. 
3. U.S. State Law on Bribery and Corruption 
States within the U.S. have individual sets of statutes that address both public and 
commercial bribery in connection to private (nongovernmental) business. Individual state 
statutes prohibit the bribery of state and local officials. Commercial bribery statutes, 
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which vary to some extent from state to state, generally criminalize the bribery of private 
business employees (and the employee’s acceptance of bribes). (Woolf Committee, 2008) 
4. United States Defense Industry Initiative (DII) on Business Ethics and 
Conduct 
“DII is a consortium of U.S. defense industry contractors which subscribes to a 
set of principles for achieving higher standards of business ethics and conduct.” 
(Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011) The customer of these companies is the United 
States Department of Defense. 
The signatory companies are obliged to promote ethical conducts of business 
through the implementation of anti-corruption policies, procedures and other instruments 
in the areas of ethics and ethics training, internal reporting, self-governance, attendance at 
Best Practices Forums, and accountability to the public. (Defense Industry Initiative, 
1997)  In addition to adopting and adhering to this set of principles, signatory companies 
are also required to encourage these principles as “a standard for the entire defense 
industry, and a model for other industries” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2011). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Corruption continues to manifest itself in a number of ways. It ranges 
from petty to grand in nature, from political to bureaucratic in focus, and 
from incidental to systemic in scope. Although perhaps self-evident, it is 
important to recognize that the errant behavior of individuals lies at the 
heart of corruption. Anti-corruption efforts often attempt to create an 
ethical standard by which individuals are supposed to abide, ignoring the 
fact that if such officials were moral beings, the corruption would not 
occur in the first instance. (McCusker, 2006) 
Any successful anti-corruption strategy therefore should endeavor to 
understand the often complex interactions that exist between the initiator 
of the corrupt act, the person who passively or actively participates in 
corruption and the wider society which meets the costs, directly or 
indirectly, of that corruption. (McCusker, 2006) 
Additionally, the defense establishment has historically been one of the least 
transparent of any government organizations; it is very closed to public or even intra-
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government scrutiny. The secrecy that is necessary to some defense activities often 
extends more widely than can be justified, leaving the defense sector with little oversight 
and large risks of corruption (Ben Magahy D. S., 2009). 
Transparency suggests procedural visibility and clarity, facilitated by media 
investigations, parliamentary oversight, and academic scrutiny. Ensuring transparency 
requires proactive measures: providing information to the press; discovering errors, 
mistakes and malfeasance; and maintaining regular cooperative liaisons with national 
legislative bodies. Transparency must be assiduously pursued (Tagarev, Transparency in 
Defence Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement, 2002, p. 23). 
In terms of the design of anti-corruption strategies it is important to 
construct a set of incentives to encourage rule-abiding, and discourage 
rule-averse, behavior by individuals engaged in corrupt practices. Thus, 
for example, strategies which reduce the scope for corruption via policy 
changes, increase the costs of corruption via monitoring and punishment 
of errant behavior and induce self-restraint within government are 
important first principles.(McCusker, 2006) 
In this context, international organizations (OECD, WTO, UN and IMF), defense 
business corporation organizations (DII), governments, and non-governmental 
organizations (Transparency International) have developed tools, strategies, and 
mechanisms for aiding the fight against corruption in the public procurement process—
especially in the defense procurement process. 
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING ANTI-CORRUPTION 
MECHANISMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Today, countries are tightly connected internationally through trade, financial 
transactions, and new forms of communication. This is extremely important for the 
prosperity of global community. However, it is also easy for corruption to spread 
between countries through international networks (Transparency International, 2006). 
This means that efforts on both national and international scales can impact corruption 
worldwide. 
Many bilateral and multilateral efforts have recently been developed by 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academic experts to 
curb corruption. These comprehensive efforts include the introduction of new, 
cooperation between governments through anti-corruption conventions and transnational 
organizations, and the implementation of anti-corruption programs. (Alan Rousso, 2006) 
Integrated anti-corruption programs generally include conceptual documents, anti-
corruption laws, dedicated agencies, inter-ministerial commisions, action plans, and 
monitoring mechanisms. Many countries have adopted a mixture of these anti-corruption 
programs (Alan Rousso, 2006). However, it is equally important to examine the - 
effectiveness of these programs. 
This chapter focuses on the major Anti-corruption Conventions, and assesses their 
ability to reduce corruption. The “Convention Coverage Map” is presented to illustrate 
which vulnerabilities were addressed in these Conventions.  
The primary objective of this research is to identify the impacts of these efforts to 
reduce defense related corruption. However, due to the lack of specific regional indices, 
the deductions of this thesis are based on general data and broad indices on corruption. In 





general perceptions and data are useful indicators to reach a conclusion; defense 
procurement coincides with public procurement, so defense related corruption correlates 
to the general corruption of countries. 
The concept of this research was to limit observations to ten countries that have 
adopted one or more of the aforementioned conventions, have a considerable amount of 
defense related import-export activities and expenditure, and most importantly, provide 
data that can be interpreted and compared with the other countries. According to these 
criteria, the countries chosen for research were the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Australia, and India. A matrix 
was created reflecting the coverage of these Conventions to provide a better 
understanding of their scope. 
To reach a conclusion, data was derived from the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicator (WGI), The Ibrahim Index of African Government, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI), and 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). Additionally, some 
information from the Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 
was consulted in order to compare and support findings. The TI Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 
also provided us the bribery perception scores of senior officers in the arms and defense 
industries.  
The WGI Index identifies the six dimensions of governance as Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. (Daniel 
Kaufmann, 2010) This research uses the “Control of Corruption” scores in its 
observations. Similarly, this research uses the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom (IEF), which measures economic freedom under ten headings. (The Heritage 
Foundation, 2011) The Ibrahim Index of African Government is structured under 4 titles, 
which contains 14 sub-titles, 121 variables, and 86 Indicators (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 
2011); this research employs the “Corruption and Bureaucracy” scores under the 
“Accountability” subtitle of  the “Safety and Rule of Law” title.  
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This thesis introduces the positive and negative changes that took place in the 
adopting countries after the ratification of the relevant conventions. The Common 
Industry Standards are used to map out the conventions’ effects in applying companies. 
B ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION 
CONVENTIONS 
This section focuses on the effectiveness of the International Conventions against 
Corruption in the specified countries. 
1. The Coverage of Anti-Corruption Conventions 
There are several risks related to the procurement of defense equipment. In order 
to decrease the amount of vulnerabilities in the procurement process, these risks should 
be addressed by through anti-corruption mechanisms. Table 1 shows risks and 
vulnerabilities are matched with those of the Anti-Corruption Convention and NATO-
TI’s Self-Assessment Questionnaire; this reveals which risks have been already been 
adequately addressed, and which still need more attention.  The first table depicts the 
vulnerabilities produced by the actions of government personnel. The second table 
exhibits similar vulnerabilities generated by corporate and defense industry personnel. 
During the production of this chart, it was taken into consideration that anti-
corruption conventions are very broad international arrangements. The conclusions 
indicate that attention to specific vulnerabilities was based on the existence of references 
to these risks in convention texts. The NATO-TI Self-Assessment Questionnaire 
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Table 1.   Coverage Map for Procurement Vulnerabilities and Risks (Public Personnel) 
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According to these coverage maps, we notice that the anti-corruption conventions 
are covering the issues of competition, personal conflict, and bribery in public services. 
However, wasteful outcomes, and unnecessary/no-value offset agreements are not 
properly addressed.  
Even if these conventions address the aforementioned problems of competition, 
personal conflicts, and bribery, results vary greatly between countries; and the application 
of available methods of fighting corruption is different in each country. 
2. Major Corruption Indices and Country Scores 
The “country tables” display scores for each country from the major corruption 
indices. The scores visualize the changes in a country’s corruption perceptions after it 
adopted the relevant conventions.  
a. United States 
The United States signed the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption in June 1996, and put it into effect in September 2000. Later, the U.S. 
accepted the OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in December 
1998, and put it into force on February 15, 1999. In December 2003 the U.S. signed the 
UN’s Convention against Corruption and put it into action in October 2006. In addition to 
these international and regional conventions against corruption, the U.S. has forbidden its 
companies from cross-border bribery since 1977, after the introduction of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  According to this act, companies are mandated to 
maintain records concerning foreign transactions; one important contribution of the 
FCPA “has been the concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction in criminal matters means 
event the “foreign bribery occurs outside the United States, U.S. courts can exercise 
jurisdiction over offender firms falling under FCPA” (Pidaparthi, 2005). 
According to the U.S.-Corruption Indices (Table 3), it is not possible for 





United States. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, with the exception of the Bribe Payers 
Index (BPI), the indexes show that scores have decreased, indicating an increase in 
corruption.    
United States of America 
Year Index 
 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 1,56408778  N/A 90 - 
1997 - N/A  78 - 
1998 1,546660062 7,5 77 - 
1999 - 7,5 76 6,2 
2000 1,64172971 7,8 75 - 
2001 - 7,6 75 - 
2002 2,048113454 7,7 78 5,3 
2003 1,727916469 7,5 76 - 
2004 1,788403051 7,5 77 - 
2005 1,515147344 7,6 75 - 
2006 1,266646025 7,3 75 7,22 
2007 1,292365569 7,2 76 - 
2008 1,452838288 7,3 73 8,1 
2009 1,156200905 7,5 72 - 
2010 1,232890271 7,1 73 - 
2011 - -  75 8,1 
Table 3.   United States Corruption Indexes Scores 
b. United Kingdom 
The UK accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in December 
1998, and put it into force in February 1999. (OECD) The UK signed the UNCAC in 
December 2003 and put it into effect in February 2006. Furthermore, the UK adopted the 
European Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2004, but has not ratified the Civil 
Law Convention after signing it in 2000. (Council of Europe) 
The corruption index scores for the UK do not provide evidence of 
improvement in corruption perceptions following the adoption of conventions. There is a 
significant decline in the World Governance Indicator, Corruption Perception Index, and 
in Economic Freedom Index. The UK has several allegations concerning defense 
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corruption: “There have been persistent allegations of bribery in the £43bn government-
to-government deal, known as Al-Yamamah to sell defense equipment to Saudi Arabia” 
(Pfeifer S. F., 2008). 
In the 2008 Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
Transparency International stated that:  
THE UK’s termination of Al Yamamah- related bribery allegations 
against BAE Systems (BAE) in December 2006 was a damaging setback 
for the Convention. The assertion that national security concerns   
overrode the obligation to enforce the Convention, created a dangerous 
precedent that other governments could readily follow. (Jeffery Taylor, 
2011) 
United Kingdom 
 Year Index 
 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 2,119425995 8,44 90 - 
1997 - 8,22 90 - 
1998 2,231704561 8,7 90 - 
1999  - 8,6 82 7,2 
2000 2,173134532 8,7 87 - 
2001  - 8,3 86 - 
2002 2,131336396 8,7 87 6,9 
2003 2,071543294 8,7 83 - 
2004 1,950486167 8,6 87 - 
2005 1,904425441 8,6 87 - 
2006 1,801889499 8,6 86 7,39 
2007 1,724586684 8,4 86 - 
2008 1,683455212 7,7 86 8,6 
2009 1,536722236 7,7 84 - 
2010 1,481645251 7,6 77 - 
2011  - -  77 8,3 




Germany accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention November 
1998, and put it into force in February 1999.  (OECD) Germany signed the UNCAC in 
2003 but has not ratified it yet. Germany has also signed the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption; the Civil Law Convention on Corruption has been signed 
but not ratified or implemented (Wolf, 2006). 
Germany continues to be one of the world’s most powerful and dynamic 
economies. (The Heritage Foundation, 2011) Often, Germany is the supplier during the 
procurement process. Currently, Germany has only ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, but it enforces strict anti-corruption laws in accordance with the remaining 
conventions. However, similar to the U.S. and UK cases, the corruption index scores do 
not show evidence of improvement in corruption perceptions after adoption of the 
conventions. On the contrary, there is increase in the perception of corruption 
(corresponding to the decrease in scores). Germany has been accused of bribery in 
defense deals; most recently, the German engineering firm Ferrostaal’s was accused of 







 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 1,993327561 8,27 90 - 
1997 - 8,23 81 - 
1998 2,164021896 7,9 83 6,2 
1999 - 8 82 - 
2000 2,039511692 7,6 79 - 
2001 - 7,4 80 - 
2002 2,014033037 7,3 76 6,3 
2003 1,954275536 7,7 74 - 
2004 1,866052205 8,2 73 - 
2005 1,861743586 8,2 77 - 
2006 1,800089239 8 82 7,34 
2007 1,704739755 7,8 82 - 
2008 1,755087035 7,9 80 8,6 
2009 1,713548701 8 78 - 
2010 1,700708395 7,9 79 - 
2011 - - 80 8,6 
Table 5.   Germany Corruption Indexes Scores 
d. Sweden 
Sweden accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in June 1999, 
and put it into action in August 1999.  (OECD) Later, Sweden signed the UNCAC in 
December 2003 and put it into action in September 2007. Additionally, the UK adopted 
the European Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and the European Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption in 2004. 
Sweden is an exemplary model of transparency and freedom from 
corruption. According to its scores in the corruption perception indexes, Sweden does not 
urgently need to improve its anti-corruption procedures.  
However, this evidence can also be used as evidence that positive changes 
in country scores are not possible after the adoption of conventions.  
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A significant corruption issue in Sweden was the sale of JAS Gripen multirole fighters to 
South Africa in the late 1990s. Recently, Sweden’s National Anti-Corruption Unit (NAC) 




 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 2,304953486 9,08 90 - 
1997 -  9,35 89 - 
1998 2,3311854 9,5 91 8,3 
1999 -  9,4 94 - 
2000 2,417420885 9,4 95 - 
2001 -  9 94 - 
2002 2,312792936 9,3 94 8,4 
2003 2,233149329 9,3 90 - 
2004 2,173477901 9,2 93 - 
2005 2,011841815 9,2 93 - 
2006 2,211879919 9,2 92 7,62 
2007 2,249531192 9,3 92 - 
2008 2,255099693 9,3 92 - 
2009 2,275510992 9,2 93 - 
2010 2,250953346 9,2 93 - 
2011  -  - 92 - 
Table 6.   Sweden Corruption Indexes Scores 
e. Japan 
Japan accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in October 1998, 
and put it into action in February 1999.  (OECD) Additionally, Japan signed the UNCAC 
in December 2003, but has not put it into effect yet. In its regional efforts, Japan has 
endorsed the Asian Development Bank Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in November 2001.  
The Japanese defense market is an oligopoly. Firms in the defense 
industry also produce civilian goods, and the revenues they obtain from 
defense contracts are quite small relative to the revenues coming from 
the production of private goods. Because the Japanese constitution 
prohibits arms export, the defense industry in Japan essentially serves an 
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internal market. Furthermore, defense contracts are not awarded on a 
competitive basis. The procurement procedures rely on cost-plus 
contracts, most of which are carried out at the discretion of the 
bureaucrats in charge. Information on prices and contracts thus become 
extremely opaque, which makes it easier for misuse and corruption to 
flourish. (Quyen, 2008) 
Table 7 shows that Japanese corruption perception scores show a slow, 
steady improvement throughout the years. 
Japan 
Year Index 
 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 1,044752289 7,05 90 - 
1997 - 6,57 67 - 
1998 0,928449238 5,8 71 5,1 
1999 - 6 66 - 
2000 1,170723751 6,4 58 - 
2001 - 7,1 60 - 
2002 0,844434534 7,1 64 5,3 
2003 1,171928442 7 71 - 
2004 1,227802024 6,9 71 - 
2005 1,213406082 7,3 70 - 
2006 1,348402375 7,6 69 7,1 
2007 1,2141272 7,5 73 - 
2008 1,258340378 7,3 76 8,6 
2009 1,328661502 7,7 75 - 
2010 1,537605809 7,8 73 - 
2011 -  - 77 8,6 
Table 7.   Japan - Corruption Indexes Scores 
f. Australia 
Australia accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in October 
1999, and put it into action in December 1999.  (OECD) Later,  in December 2003 they 
signed the UNCAC and put it into force in December 2005. Additionally, Australia has 
endorsed the Asian Development Bank Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in October 2003. 
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Australia is also a good example in the fight against corruption. Out of 12 
countries surveyed, TI found that Australia is one of two countries that provide clear and 
accessible codes of conduct in matters related to defense (Bell, 2011). Australia’s scores 
on the corruption Index shows nearly stagnant scores with little improvement.  





 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 1,884342018 8,6 70 - 
1997 - 8,86 88  
1998 1,765287525 8,7 86 8,1 
1999 - 8,7 89 - 
2000 1,960539274 8,3 87 - 
2001 - 8,5 87 - 
2002 1,734808183 8,6 83 8,5 
2003 1,924659082 8,8 85 - 
2004 2,097818642 8,8 86 - 
2005 1,93426755 8,8 88 - 
2006 1,960589508 8,7 88 7,59 
2007 2,047172717 8,6 88 - 
2008 2,120562893 8,7 87 8,5 
2009 2,05622087 8,7 86 - 
2010 2,061006848 8,7 87 - 
2011 -  - 87 8,5 
Table 8.   Australia Corruption Indexes Scores 
g. Brazil 
Brazil accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in August 2000, 
and put it into force in October 2000. (OECD) Brazil attended the regional Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, signed the convention in March 1996, and put 




The overall score and changes in the perception do not suggest an 
improvement in Brazil’s corruption. On the contrary, scores indicate a decrease in 
success. In July 2011, Brazil’s transportation minister resigned due to a corruption 
scandal; in August, the President was accused of passing a multi-billion dollar contract to 
buy fighter jets (BBC News, 2011).  In Brazil, the proper application of anti-corruption 
conventions and related regulations are still in their infancy.  
Brazil 
Year Index 
 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 -0,074428144 2,96 30 - 
1997  - 3,56 27 - 
1998 -0,001239009 4 30 - 
1999 -  4,1 36 - 
2000 0,043222089 3,9 40 - 
2001 -  4 41 - 
2002 0,012420952 4 39 - 
2003 0,107676083 3,9 40 - 
2004 0,028712602 3,9 40 - 
2005 -0,171457962 3,7 39 - 
2006 -0,141919383 3,3 39 5,65 
2007 -0,114484714 3,5 37 - 
2008 -0,015217099 3,5 33 7,4 
2009 -0,103992257 3,7 35 - 
2010 0,05611194 3,7 35 - 
2011  - -  37 7,7 
Table 9.   Brazil Corruption Indexes Scores 
h. Argentina 
Argentina accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention in February 
2001, and put it into force in February 2001.(OECD) Argentina also signed the regional 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption in March 1996, and put it in effect in 




In Argentina, corruption is widespread (The Heritage Foundation, 2011). 
Corruption has permeated both the government and private sectors, as the scores below 
show. Although Argentina adopted the conventions earlier than others, we cannot 




 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 -0,215799119 3,41 70 - 
1997  - 2,81 52 - 
1998 -0,186931735 3 34 - 
1999  - 3 28 - 
2000 -0,325497322 3,5 30 - 
2001  - 3,5 30 - 
2002 -0,523824188 2,8 35 - 
2003 -0,537974912 2,5 35 - 
2004 -0,439597558 2,5 28 - 
2005 -0,41636537 2,8 25 - 
2006 -0,386392635 2,9 25 - 
2007 -0,394043468 2,9 28 - 
2008 -0,471015832 2,9 29 - 
2009 -0,515985931 2,9 29 - 
2010 -0,437428278 2,9 29 - 
2011  -   29 - 
Table 10.   Argentina Corruption Indexes Scores 
i. South Africa 
South Africa accepted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention June 2007, 
and put it into force in August 2007.  (OECD) In December 2003, South Africa signed 
the UNCAC and and put it into force in November 2004. In regional efforts, South Africa 
signed the African Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption in March 2004, 
and put it into force in November 2005.  
In South Africa, corruption is most apparent in the awarding of government 
contracts. There are many examples of high-profile procurement scandals related to 
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bribery issues.  There are also many unrevealed scandals at the provincial level, 
indicating that the provinces “are also struggling with serious irregularities in public 
procurement and contracting. Multinational companies have been involved in what is 
commonly known as the ‘Arms Deal’, which is the largest corruption scandal in post-
apartheid South Africa. The former Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, was accused of being 
involved in the ‘Arms Deal’ scandal, where he allegedly demanded a bribe of ZAR 
500,000 from the companies involved in the scandal” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 
2011). 
Table 11 reflects the mentioned corruption problems in South Africa. The 




 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI IIAG 
1996 0,75919542 5,68 50 - - 
1997  - 4,95 56 - - 
1998 0,648495684 5,2 57 - - 
1999  - 5 50 - - 
2000 0,612433257 5 52 - 85,7 
2001  - 4,8 50 - 71,4 
2002 0,391219774 4,8 50 - 57,1 
2003 0,33110311 4,4 48 - 57,1 
2004 0,473683211 4,6 48 - 64 
2005 0,581727372 4,5 44 - 85,7 
2006 0,429021003 4,6 46 5,61 85,7 
2007 0,222326776 5,1 45 - 71,4 
2008 0,151418668 4,9 46 7,5 71,4 
2009 0,11260138 4,7 51 - 57,1 
2010 0,093919992 4,5 49 - - 
2011  - -  47 7,6 - 




India signed the UNCAC in December 2005 and put into effect in May 
2011, but India has not yet signed the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Convention. In regional 
efforts, India has endorsed the Asian Development Bank Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in 
November 2001. 
In India, there have been major corruption scandals involving high-level 
politicians’ related to public procurement and contracting. There are particular allegations 
of corruption directed at the energy, telecommunication and defense sectors. In some 
cases, companies that previously violated the procurement regulations managed to win 
contracts by circumventing the law through their connections. (Business Anti-Corruption 
Portal, 2011)  According to a 2010 report, the India Fraud Survey, “an overwhelming 
majority of the respondents indicated that the incidence of fraud, overall and specifically 
within their industry and company, is rising thereby indicating that India Inc. needs to 
deal with fraud risks firmly, and procurement, distribution and revenue leakage is the 
single most corruption exposed area” (KPMG India, 2010). 
The grades in the perception indices reflect that India’s improvement 
through years is poor.  Until recently, India had not been a part of international anti-
corruption efforts, but India reflects a pattern similar to countries like South Africa, 
Argentina and Brazil. The effect of these conventions can be discerned by comparing the 
countries that adopted the regulations years ago with the countries that have not adopted 
them yet. In this case, there is not a significant difference between the corruption levels 






 WGI(Corruption) CPI IEF BPI 
1996 -0,405534733 2,63 10 - 
1997 - 2,75 28 - 
1998 -0,285922008 2,9 26 - 
1999 - 2,9 28 - 
2000 -0,365128891 2,8 29 - 
2001 - 2,7 29 - 
2002 -0,490804882 2,7 28 - 
2003 -0,4330392 2,8 27 - 
2004 -0,418159924 2,8 27 - 
2005 -0,40172312 2,9 28 - 
2006 -0,278848612 3,3 28 4,62 
2007 -0,417246746 3,5 29 - 
2008 -0,403179158 3,4 33 6,8 
2009 -0,368219241 3,4 35 - 
2010 -0,516719172 3,3 34 - 
2011 -  - 34 7,5 
Table 12.   India Corruption Indexes Scores 
Based on this research, it can be concluded that conventions have not had 
a significant positive effect in the fight against corruption. Some countries have had 
success with anti-corruption programs both in the past and present, but others struggle 
with the same problems for years without any improvement. A 2009 report by TI, 
comparing the implementation of the OECD convention in signatory countries, describes 
some progress, but also draws attention to the variances between the countries 
enforcement levels of the conventions (Dell, 2009). Regardless, even when conventions 
are ratified and enacted by countries; “most states are willing to increase the probability 
of ‘their’ domestic companies getting contracts in foreign countries, and thus have few 
incentives to encourage investigations of their own firms, even if contracts are obtained 
in a way that they violate the treaties.” (Soreide, 2006, s. 382) All participating countries 




(Davis, 2002) Other critics argue that “international conventions are generally inspired by 
ideological considerations, but individual country behavior is guided by economic 
considerations” (Pidaparthi, 2005, s. 113). 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we intended to display the effectiveness of Anti-Corruption 
mechanisms, specifically the international anti-corruption conventions. The coverage of 
these conventions is mapped in the context of procurement vulnerabilities; index scores 
for the last 15 years of the major arms importing-exporting countries traced in the context 
of corruption perceptions.  
There appears to be no positive change in the corruption perception index scores 
of countries after they ratified and applied the requirements of these conventions. These 
observations support the statement that it may be “premature to evaluate the general 
impact of the relatively new international anti-corruption conventions.” (Soreide, 2006, p. 
381) Although the extents of these conventions are adequate in theory, the 
implementation of these regulations is still problematic. The question remains whether 
corruption in some of these countries might have gotten substantially worse if the 
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VI. ANALYSES OF THREE DIFFERENT CASES FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA, US, SAUDI ARABIA AND UK 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will explore three cases related to defense procurement. These cases 
are from different parts of the globe: South Africa, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and the UK. 
Mainly, these three cases involve exceptionally high monetary value, corruption 
vulnerabilities, unneeded or wasteful offset arrangements that lack military value or 
public interest, unnecessary exclusion from competition, and the employment of agents, 
brokers, and other intermediaries as conduits to illicit payments and services unrelated to 
the goals of contracts. 
B. SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE  
1. Background 
The background information related to the South African experience from 
Magahy et al. (2010) is as follows: 
The South African government approved the Strategic Arms Procurement 
Package in December 1999 costing R 30 billion (ca.U.S. 4.8 billion in 
1999). The programme, involving purchases of high-tech warships, 
submarines, and aircraft from Germany, Sweden, Italy and the UK, has 
been the source of much controversy, both over the appropriateness of the 
package for South Africa, and over allegations of corruption in the 
numerous contracts contained within. 
The allegations implicated several senior figures in the South African 
government in receiving bribes to fund the ruling ANC’s 1999 re-election 
campaign and, according to former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein, possibly 
to support the R 1.7 billion surplus currently held by the ANC. 
The programme’s ambitious offsets programme was envisaged to run over 
a period of eight to fourteen years, and initially estimated to create 65,000 
jobs and generate revenue of R 111 billion. Such forecasts may have been 
faulty—one study by Dunne and Lamb (2004) concluded that the 
economic benefits of offsets were unclear and there were “considerable 
doubts about whether South Africa as a whole has or will benefit from the 
deal.” According to the authors, offsets’ causality and sustainability 
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remained also to be proven. A further study by Haines (2004) concluded 
that “employment creation by offset projects is limited, particularly in 
peripheral regions” and that there was evidence of substantial hidden costs 
associated with offsets. Moreover, according to a 20 March 2008 edition 
of South African news publication Mail & Guardian as well as scholars 
Dunne and Lamb, allegations of corruption accused government and 
senior defence officials of having conflicts of interest when awarding 
offsets contracts to companies to which they had direct links, in abuse of 
the policy of Black Economic Empowerment. 
Despite such alleged instances of corruption in the offsets programme, a 
government investigation team reported that though it found irregularities 
and improprieties in the conduct of certain government officials, it found 
no evidence of improper or unlawful conduct by the government as a 
whole. However, this report excluded one from the Attorney General on 
the submarines’ acquisition. 
This document flagged unlawful practices during the evaluation phase and 
over the high score given to the largest of the offset projects, affecting the 
award of the supply contract. What is more, nine years later that project 
was still not completed. Finally, allegations of corruption in the offset 
package and the wider defence deal have been routinely featured in the 
popular media in South Africa. (Magahy et al., 2010, p.27) 
2. Analysis 
The case of South Africa and the relevant allegations indicates some of the 
procurement related vulnerabilities to corruption: 
a. Offsets Lacking Military Value or Public Interest 
Offsets in the procurement process sometimes complicate monitoring and 
oversight efforts. Due to their opaque, complex, and highly technical nature, offsets 
attract little attention. Moreover, they involve a high amount of monetary value and do 
not have enough transparency and accountability. The combination of these factors 
contributes to increasing corruption related risks and the emergence of new opportunities 
for defense corruption (Magahy et al., 2010). 
Before analyzing the South African case, the justifications set forth by decision 
makers for such a high monetary value need to be examined: 
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To justify  its  decision to purchase  from foreign suppliers and to win 
public support for the arms deal, the South African government has  
continually  stressed  the potential  positive effects  of  the  proposed 
industrial participation (IP)  offset-related industry  and the  national  
economy.  At the time of approving the programme, they stated that the 
foreign suppliers had made IP offers worth R104 billion which would 
result in the creation of more than 65 000 jobs over a period of seven years 
Batchelor, P., & Dunne, P. (2000) p.1 
The emphasis should be on the offsets and their likely positive outcomes such as 
new employment and contribution to the economic growth. However, the figures 
presented by the South African government for offsets (which are Industrial Participation 
in this case) have attracted some criticism from scholars like Batchelor and Dunne 
(2000): 
The job creation estimates which were presented by government in 
September 1999 suggest that R104 billion worth of IP commitments will 
create approximately 65 000 jobs—this amounts to R1, 6 million per job. 
This figure is extremely high and nearly 20 times higher than the average 
cost per job in the local defence industry. (…)Any such estimates are 
questionable,  however, as the impact of the arms acquisition programmes, 
including  the DIP [Defense Industrial Participation] activities,  on  job  
creation in  the  local  defence- related industry is  difficult  to  quantify.  
Certainly  local  purchases  by  the foreign suppliers, equity investments, 
joint ventures and export contracts will help to maintain jobs  in  the  local  
defence-related  industry,  and  prevent further  retrenchments.  In 
addition, even if the estimates presented above are accepted, they 
represent consider- ably fewer jobs than could be created if the money 
were used for other purposes than buying arms. 
Moreover, Dunne and Lamb (2004) expressed doubts concerning the future 
capabilities of offset companies indicating that it’s “not clear that the companies will be 
internationally competitive to allow follow-on industrial development to be sustainable.” 
(Dunne and Lamb ,2004, p.290)   
The case shows the gaps and problem areas that offset programs potentially carry 
within themselves:  
They can be utilized as instruments to complete corruption schemes related to the 
acquisition process, “allowing payments to be made to governmental and military 
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officials, directly or indirectly, for undue influences over the decision process.” (Magahy 
et al., 2010) 
In addition, “offset programmes may be used to influence award decisions, even 
though they can be changed afterwards and the decision most times may not.” (Magahy 
et al., 2010) 
b. Government Official/Contracting Officer PCI (Personal Conflict 
of Interest) 
Furthermore, during the implementation of acquisition programs, many flaws 
have occurred, eventually leading to costs for political figures. It caused the suspension 
of one government official, and according to a news article in the Economist: 
A European bidder had already admitted to securing discounts on flashy 
cars for several politicians. One of these, Tony Yengeni, the ruling party’s 
former chief whip, was arrested in October for fraud, perjury and 
corruption. And on November 16th, a local bidder for an arms contract, 
Shabir Shaik, was charged with illegally possessing cabinet secrets on the 
deal. His brother was the government’s chief negotiator for the 1999 deal, 
but this week was suspended from his job. The Economist Gunning for 
Profit. (2001, November 24)., 
C. THE DARLENE DRUYUN CASE 
1. Background 
The information regarding the Darlene Druyun case is gathered from several 
GAO sources: GAO Testimony, (GAO, 2005a) about the sustainment of protests 
challenging the roles of biased officials; GAO Decision, (GAO, 2005b) about the small 
diameter bomb (SDB) program; and GAO Decision,( GAO, 2005c) about the avionics 
modernization upgrade program (AMP) for the C-130 aircraft. 
The background information from GAO Testimony, (GAO, 2005a) is as follows: 
(…) in October 2004 Darleen Druyun pled guilty to violating the conflict 
of interest provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) based on the fact that she 
engaged in employment negotiations with The Boeing Company while she 
was negotiating on behalf of the Air Force for the lease of 100 Boeing KC 
767A tanker aircraft. In addition to her employment negotiations, 
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documents submitted by Druyun in connection with the criminal 
proceedings establish that, in 2000, Druyun contacted Boeing personnel to 
request that Boeing provide employment for both Druyun’s daughter and 
the daughter’s boyfriend (who subsequently became Druyun’s son-in-
law). In response to these requests, Boeing created a position for Druyun’s 
daughter and hired both her daughter and future son-in-law in the fall of 
2000. In the documents filed in the criminal proceedings, Druyun further 
states that her decisions in matters affecting Boeing were “influenced by 
her perceived indebtedness to Boeing for employing her future son-in-law 
and daughter,” and that with regard to the contract awarded in the C-130 
AMP procurement, “an objective selection authority may not have 
selected Boeing.” 
Following Druyun’s disclosures in October 2004, agency-level protests 
were filed at the Air Force by the three offerors who unsuccessfully 
competed for the C-130 contract: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 
L-3 Communications  Integrated Systems, (the successor-in-interest to 
Raytheon Company Aircraft Integration Systems), and BAE Systems 
Integrated Defense Solutions, Inc. The Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Acquisition subsequently advised each of the protesters that “the 
Air Force is of the opinion that the protest is more appropriately 
considered by the Government Accountability Office,” and that “the Air 
Force will not decide the protest.” Each of the companies subsequently 
filed protests with our Office maintaining that Druyun’s recently disclosed 
bias in favor of Boeing, along with the information previously disclosed to 
the protesters regarding the agency’s purported bases for rejecting their 
proposals, demonstrated that their proposals were not evaluated in a fair 
and unbiased manner. 
In response to the protests, the Air Force argued that notwithstanding 
Druyun’s acknowledged  bias in favor of Boeing, the award to Boeing was 
proper because “there is no evidence  that Mrs. Druyun influenced the 
SSET [source selection evaluation team]” and that, overall, “the 
evaluation process was conducted properly and in accordance with the 
evaluation criteria.” 
In that testimony GAO also presents its review of the records of the case: 
(…) The record developed by GAO, including the hearing testimony, 
established the following key points. First, Druyun functioned as the lead 
procurement official throughout this procurement and employed a forceful 
management style. In this particular procurement, she left no doubt about 
who was in control from the outset. Before the evaluators had even 
completed their initial proposal review, Druyun requested that they come 
to Washington, D.C. to discuss the “status” of their evaluations; this 
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meeting was subsequently referred to as the “15 September massacre.” 
From September 15, 2000 through the first request for final proposal 
revisions in February 2001, Druyun had the evaluators come to 
Washington five times to brief her on the ongoing evaluations; during 
these briefings, Druyun expressly or implicitly directed multiple changes 
to the evaluators’ ratings, many of which favored Boeing. In our decision, 
we identify specific examples of Druyun’s directions regarding each of the 
offerors’ proposals. 
Also, the record shows that following the request for final proposal 
revisions, but before the source selection process was complete, the 
contracting officer sent an e-mail to a recipient list that included virtually 
everyone involved in the source selection process, directing that the 
recipients “clean up” and “delete” various portions of the evaluation 
record. Specifically, this e-mail directed the recipients to “delete any 
comments where evaluators/advisors have suggested ratings,” explaining 
that “[i]f the rating doesn’t match the suggestion, we have protest fodder.” 
The e-mail also specifically directed the evaluators to “[d]elete any 
derogatory or exceedingly glowing comments.” 
The first round of final proposal revisions was submitted on March 2. On 
March 9, the contracting officer reopened discussions and requested a 
second round of proposal revisions. At the GAO hearing, the contracting 
officer unambiguously testified that discussions were reopened to permit 
Boeing to “take care of” a “problem” in its cost proposal, explaining that, 
at that point, Boeing’s proposal failed to comply with instructions the 
agency had previously given the offerors. No substantive questions were 
asked of any other offeror during these discussions. Nonetheless, during 
the GAO hearing, agency witnesses identified specific aspects of the 
protesters’ final proposals that should have been brought to their attention, 
including aspects of the protesters’ proposals that appear very similar to 
the “problem” Boeing was permitted to “take care of.” 
The second round of final proposal revisions was submitted on March 19. 
Thereafter, the source selection evaluation team briefed Druyun on the 
evaluations of final proposals.  During this briefing the cost team was 
directed to review their analysis to “assure its accuracy.” Upon receiving 
that direction, the cost team reduced Boeing’s evaluated price and 
increased Lockheed’s evaluated price. Additionally, in a subsequent 
meeting with Druyun, the source selection evaluation team described a 
specific approach to performance that Boeing had proposed as one “which 
tends to induce problems.” Druyun directed that this description be 
crossed out of the evaluation record and replaced with the words: “Boeing 
will work out details post award.” 
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In addition to the case of the avionics modernization upgrade program (AMP) for 
the C-130 aircraft, “various procurement actions taken by the Department of the Air 
Force in connection with the small diameter bomb (SDB) were protested by Lockheed 
Martin Corporation” (GAO, 2005b). Below is the background information from GAO 
Decision (GAO, 2005b): 
Lockheed Martin’s protest relates, generally, to activities that took place 
between September 2001 (when Boeing and Lockheed Martin were each 
awarded component advanced development contracts under the SDB 
program) and August 2003 (when Boeing was selected for award of the 
SDD [system design and development] contract). However, the primary 
focus of the protest relates to activities that took place during the first few 
months of 2002 and culminated in the Air Force’s decision to make 
significant changes to the SDB requirements and associated evaluation 
criteria--specifically, the deletion of phase II requirements for capabilities 
against moving targets.  
(…) the agency [Air Force] awarded component advanced development 
(CAD) contracts under the SDB program to Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
in September 2001. The contractors were advised that, during the 24-
month performance period of the CAD contracts, the agency intended to 
conduct a “rolling down select evaluation” during which Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin would compete, on the basis of their performance under 
the CAD contracts, for award of the SDD contract. (…)Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin were advised of the criteria on which the SDD selection 
would be made; these criteria included, among others, a factor focusing on 
the evaluation of the contractor’s capabilities with regard to the phase I 
fixed target requirements and a factor focusing on the evaluation of the 
contractor’s capabilities with regard to the phase II moving target 
requirements. 
(…) at least initially, the agency “envisioned” the use of [deleted] to 
perform the phase II moving target requirements. (…) The record 
indicates that early in 2002, Lockheed Martin was viewed as having an 
advantage over Boeing with regard to [deleted]. Further, early in the 
procurement process, this advantage was interpreted as “strength in Phase 
II” for Lockheed Martin. 
(…) briefing documents prepared by the SDB program manager in 
connection with briefings given to the Air Force Chief of Staff and the 
Secretary of the Air Force (…) contain check marks in Lockheed Martin’s 
column, indicating relative strengths, beside the terms “[deleted] (Spiral 
II)” and “[deleted] (Spiral II).” 
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(…) In May 2002, following several months of meetings, briefings, and 
discussions within the Air Force, the Secretary of the Air Force approved 
various recommended changes to the SDB program—including the 
deletion of phase II requirements regarding moving targets. 
(…)Thereafter, the evaluation criteria applicable to the selection of an 
SDD contractor were similarly revised to eliminate consideration of the 
deleted requirements. (…)In August 2003, Boeing was selected for award 
of the SDD contract. (…)In November 2003, the Air Force executed a 
justification and approval (J&A) providing for the addition, on a sole-
source basis, of the phase II moving target requirements to Boeing’s SDD 
contract. 
2. Analysis 
The Druyun case became one of the biggest defense related scandals in U.S. 
history. There has been a lot of media coverage about Druyun case, and in the aftermath 
of the scandal, many experts examined the causes of corruption in cases of such high 
monetary value, and the outcomes and negative consequences to the Air Force and the 
U.S. government. The Dryun case did not only cost money, as Branstetter observes: 
“what is clear is that in addition to the untold sum of treasure that Ms. Druyun’s misdeeds 
will cost the Government, countless hidden costs will be exacted through a loss of the 
trust of contractors and taxpayers alike in the government procurement system” 
(Branstetter, 2005). 
GAO declared its decision after reviewing the protests submitted by the other 
bidders in which Boeing was awarded a contract through the help of Druyun: 
(…) we rejected the Air Force’s assertion that there was no evidence that 
Mrs. Druyun influenced the source selection evaluation team. Similarly, in 
light of the failure to treat offerors fairly regarding discussions, we 
rejected the Air Force’s assertion that the evaluation process had been 
conducted properly. Finally, because the contracting officer directed the 
evaluators to destroy various portions of the evaluation record and the 
agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions with all of the offerors, 
along with the evidence of Druyun’s influence throughout the source 
selection process, we could not reasonably determine which of the four 
proposals should have been selected for award.  
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We concluded that the record failed to establish that any one of the 
protesters was not prejudiced by the various procurement flaws. 
Accordingly, we sustained the protests.(GAO, 2005a) 
The Druyun case and its allegations indicate some procurement related 
vulnerabilities to corruption: 
a. Government Official’s Personal Conflict of Interest: 
In this case, the most prominent type of corruption occurs in the conduct 
of government officials in the presence of a clear conflict of personal interests. Druyun 
directed the procurement processes of the avionics modernization upgrade program 
(AMP) for the C-130 aircraft (GAO, 2005c), small diameter bomb (GAO, 2005b), and 
the Air Force’s KC 767A tanker lease deal (Branstetter, 2005) while attempting to place 
herself and her family in jobs with the awardee, Boeing. Druyun intervened so that the 
Boeing company would be awarded the contract, which also benefitted herself and her 
family at the expense of the government and taxpayers; Druyun was also negotiating with 
the Boeing company for an employment position.  
b. Sole Source – Exclusion from Competition: 
Although Druyun’s conflict of interest is the prevalent example of 
corruption in this case, the sole source method of selection in the case of the small 
diameter bomb (SDB) program also needs to be closely examined. The sole source 
method justified in some instances, such as the urgency and a lack of capable 
manufacturers, but in the SDB program, the sole source method was used as an 
instrument to complete the corrupt selection process by allowing the Boeing company 
back into the selection phase once the agency lead by Druyun limited its solicitation 
requirements to retain only those where Boeing was strong. “In November 2003, the Air 
Force executed a justification and approval (J&A) providing for the addition, on a sole-
source basis, of the [formerly removed] phase II moving target requirements [back] to 
Boeing’s SDD [system design and development] contract.” (GAO, 2005b)  This method 
of enlarging a previous contract award was chosen to eliminate competitors and reduce 
the possibility of challenges. 
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D. SAUDI ARABIA’S AL YAMAMAH DEAL  
1. Background 
In 1985, following negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the UK, the Al 
Yamamah contract was signed, making it the largest export incident in the UK’s history 
(Magahy et al., 2010). The deal included an oil-for-arms payment method, and the 
number of aircrafts and “40 Tornado IDS aircraft, 24 Tornado ADV aircraft, 30 Hawk 
aircraft, and 30 PC-9 aircraft, together with associated support, services and ammunition 
at an initial cost of between £3 and £4 billion” (Williams, 2008).  
After this initial deal, there was a follow-up phase signed in 1989, and another 
series of contracts in 2006, named Al-Salam, which “involved the supply of Euro-fighter 
Typhoon jets worth £5 billion to the Royal Saudi Airforce” (Williams, 2008). 
Williams gives the background information related to the allegations about the Al 
Yamamah deal: 
Allegations that bribes were paid to secure the Al-Yamamah contracts 
began almost as soon as the contracts were signed. A newspaper report in 
October 1985, one month after the contracts were signed alleged the 
payment of bribes. In March 2001, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) sent 
information to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) about allegations of fraud 
involving BAE in relation to Al-Yamamah. However, it was not until 
secret MOD documents were leaked to the press in 2004 that the SFO took 
action to investigate the allegations.  
(…)The SFO investigation was directed at allegations of suspected false 
accounting in relation to contracts for services between two travel and visa 
firms (Robert Lee International and Travellers World) and BAE in 
connection with contracts with the Saudi Government. The allegations 
were made by former employees of the firms, in a BBC programme where 
these employees alleged that as far back as 1989 they had been instructed 
by BAE to lavish cash, luxury gifts, and holidays on members of the Saudi 
Royal family responsible for overseeing the Al-Yamamah contracts. It was 
also alleged that BAE used a number of devices to disguise the payments 
and expenditures and that the money for these expenses, although 
provided by BAE in the first instance, were eventually paid for by the 
inflation of the contract prices by up to 32 per cent. 
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After two years and an estimated expenditure of £2 million, the 
investigations by the SFO into the affairs of BAE, in so far as they relate 
to the Al-Yamamah arms deal, were abruptly terminated in December 
2006. In a press statement, the Director of the SFO stated that the 
investigation was being discontinued on the basis of the need to safeguard 
national and international security and the necessity to balance the need to 
maintain the rule of law against the wider public interest and that no 
weight had been given to commercial interests or to the national economic 
interest. (Williams, 2008) 
In the meantime, BAE was facing serious charges in the U.S. regarding the 
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance program, the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a) based on the same or related facts. In 2010, BAE 
pled “guilty to offences of false accounting to settle bribery allegations made over the 
enormous al-Yamamah arms deals with Saudi Arabia stretching back more than 20 years, 
as well as corruption allegations over arms deals in central Europe” (Leigh, 2010), and 
“was sentenced to pay a $400 million criminal fine” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a).  
The U.S. department of Justice (2010b) gives the detailed information about the 
allegations related to the BAE’s Al Yamamah deal: 
At least one of the LOAs [Letters of Offer and Acceptance] identified 
“support services” that BAES was obliged to provide.  In the discharge of 
what it regarded as its obligations  under the relevant LOA, BAE provided  
substantial benefits to one KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] public 
official, who was in a position of influence regarding the KSA Fighter 
Deals (the “KSA Official”),  and to the KSA Official’s associates.  BAES 
provided these benefits through various payment mechanisms both in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. and elsewhere.  BAES did not subject 
these payments and benefits to the type of internal scrutiny and review that 
BAES had represented it would subject them to in the foregoing 
statements to the U.S. government. 
BAES provided support services to that KSA Official while in the territory 
of the U.S.  BAES provided certain of those support services through 
travel agents retained by a BAES employee, who was also a trusted 
confidant of the KSA Official.  These benefits, which were provided in the 
U.S. and elsewhere, included the purchase of travel and accommodations, 
security services, real estate, automobiles and personal items. 
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BAES undertook no or no adequate review or verification of benefits 
provided to the KSA Official, including the review or verification of over 
$5,000,000 of invoices submitted by the BAES employee from May 2001 
to early 2002, to determine whether those invoiced expenses were costs 
which met the standards of review to which BAES was committed by 
virtue of the foregoing statements made to the U.S. government. BAES’s 
provision of these benefits, and its lack of diligence and review in 
connection with such benefits, constituted a failure to comply with the 
foregoing representations made to the Department of Defense. 
BAES also used intermediaries and shell entities to conceal payments to 
certain advisors who were assisting in the solicitation, promotion and 
otherwise endeavoring to secure the conclusion or maintenance of the 
KSA Fighter Deals. 
After May and November 2001, and until early 2002, in connection with 
the KSA Fighter Deals, BAES agreed to transfer sums totaling more than 
£10,000,000 and more than $9,000,000 to a bank account in Switzerland 
controlled by an intermediary.  BAES was aware that there was a high 
probability that the intermediary would transfer part of these payments to 
the KSA Official.  BAES undertook no or no adequate review or 
verification of the purpose of these payments, and therefore BAES failed 
to comply with the foregoing representations made to the Department of 
Defense. 
2. Analysis 
The Saudi Arabia and BAE case primarily involves a corruption scheme of 
conflicts of interest; the seller possessed undue influence during the process by providing 
unrelated payments and other types of benefits to the government officials through 
‘agents, brokers and intermediaries.’ Moreover, the deal might involve corruption 
vulnerabilities to offsets (Magahy et al., 2010, p.30), but so far no findings have been 
reported. 
a. Government Official’s Personal Conflict of Interest: 
The allegations in court documents and media coverage about this case 
display the involvement of high ranking Saudi government officials and royal family 
members. Saudi officials allegedly accepted payment and services that “have no obvious 
link with defence contracts” (Fidler and Peel, 2007). These payments could have played a 
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significant role in awarding the BAE in 1985 such a high contract value, as well as 
guaranteeing the company later contracts. The U.S. Department of Justice (2010b, p.12–
13) gave detailed information about the payments and services provided to Saudi officials 
related to Al Yamamah deal: 
At least one of the LOAs [Letters of Offer and Acceptance] identified 
“support services” that BAES was obliged to provide.  In the discharge of 
what it regarded as its obligations  under the relevant LOA, BAE provided  
substantial benefits to one KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] public 
official, who was in a position of influence regarding the KSA Fighter 
Deals (the “KSA Official”),  and to the KSA Official’s associates.  
(…)BAES undertook no or no adequate review or verification of benefits 
provided to the KSA Official, including the review or verification of over 
$5,000,000 of invoices submitted by the BAES employee from May 2001 
to early 2002, to determine whether those invoiced expenses were costs 
which met the standards of review to which BAES was committed by 
virtue of the foregoing statements made to the U.S. government. 
b. Agents, brokers and intermediaries: 
Using agents, brokers, and intermediaries usually complicates the 
monitoring process;  unnecessary layers are added to tracking efforts. Sometimes, 
employing these middlemen can be used to conceal illicit payments from the scrutiny of 
internal and external control figures.  
The BAE used agents and intermediaries in this case for this purpose.  
During the U.S. investigation, “BAE has admitted it paid commissions to 
agents as part of the £43bn deal, which they say is normal practice in the 
business, and that given the size of the contracts, the sums were often 
large. But it has declined to say who received them while repeatedly 
denying any wrongdoing.” (Fidler and Peel, 2007) 
However, The U.S. Department of Justice found that “BAE also used 
intermediaries and shell entities to conceal payments to certain advisors who were 
assisting in the solicitation, promotion and otherwise endeavoring to secure the 




E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, three international cases were analyzed to identify vulnerabilities 
in the procurement process. These cases involved high monetary value contracts, 
prominent figures in government and contracting companies, politicians, and well-known 
industry figures. The identified are  
 Government official’s personal conflict of interest, 
 Unneeded and wasteful offset arrangements lacking military value or public 
interest,  
 unnecessary exclusion from competition by using sole source selection method, 
 And, utilization of agents and brokers and other intermediaries for purpose of 
undue influence of government officials. 
The South African case depicts the vulnerabilities of offsets in defense 
procurement. Offset arrangements could not yield the purported benefits and contribution 
to the domestic defense and non-defense related industrial bases. Furthermore, they were 
used as an instrument to obtain the award for the submarine contract despite lower 
limitary value, in order to influence the evaluation process by receiving higher scores and 
not fulfilling the requirement later. 
The Druyun case illustrates the risks of an individual possessing an inappropriate 
amount of discretionary power. The primary vulnerability was the government official’s 
personal conflict of interest, and employment of the sole source selection method.  
Saudi Arabia’s Al Yamamah case illustrates the corruption vulnerabilities that are 




VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the answers to research questions, conclusions, 
recommendations, and areas of further research.  
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Corruption Related Vulnerabilities that Exist in Defense 
Procurement Cycle? 
Defense procurement is not distinct from public procurement; they share many 
common corruption vulnerabilities: bidder collusion, influence from sellers and political 
figures, lack of control and oversight, privileged relations, single-sourcing, offset 
requirements, and favored bidders. Yet, defense procurement contains several distinct 
characteristics. Excessive secrecy and security measures prevent a transparent 
procurement process, which could facilitate the concealment of corrupt activities. 
2. Which Vulnerabilities Pose Higher Risk in Defense Procurement 
Cycle? 
Of all the steps in the procurement cycle, the tendering phase is the most prone to 
corruption vulnerabilities.  The primary vulnerabilities are the unnecessary exclusion 
from competition which can be named as illegitimate sole source, and wasteful, unneeded 
offset arrangements lacking military value and public interest. 
3. What are the Significant Risks Related with Offset Arrangements and 
Single-Source Procurement Methods? 
Offset arrangements are integral to contemporary arms deals; however, they often 
do not receive a necessary amount of scrutiny. Their opaque nature and relevant secrecy 
can potentially turn them into handy instruments for concealing large bribes. Generally, 
companies are not evaluated based on their offset performances, and they are reluctant to 
publicly release data about offset programs. Offset arrangements raise costs, are hard to 
monitor, and can have extremely complex structures. This complexity poses additional 
transparency risks; there is not enough skilled personnel to audit and evaluate these 
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arrangements. Furthermore, these arrangements fuel local corruption in the hands of 
procurement officials or corrupt politicians who channel sub-contracts to their own 
interest groups. Procurement officials can also create offset requirements arbitrarily, and 
form unnecessary and wasteful arrangements for the sake of their political or personal 
interests.  
Single source procurement kills competition, and the absence of a competitive 
procurement process eliminates layers of quality control, evaluation and supervision. 
Furthermore, the discretionary power of contracting officials allows them to award 
lucrative contracts; officials can manipulate conditions the tendering process to justify 
single source procurement. By reducing the number of bidders, they reduce the risk of 
appearing to unfairly favor specific companies. Similarly, collusion between bidders can 
also eliminate the competitive process. 
4. How effective are the Existing Anti-Corruption Tools and Strategies 
against Corruption in Defense Procurement Cycle? 
Conventions are major international mechanisms that combat corruption. 
Corruption in the defense sector can occur on an international level. Conventions mostly 
address bribery and personal conflict issues; they encourage integrity, competition, and 
transparency in the public procurement process.  
However, research shows that conventions do not necessarily have a positive 
effect on corruption. This may be attributed to adolescent stage of current conventions, or 
to the lack of enforcement mechanisms related to these regulations.  
5. How do the Existing Tools and Measures Correspond to the 
Corruption Vulnerabilities in Defense Procurement Cycle? 
Existing tools may only address the problems of defense procurement. The 
conventions and the FCPA for the U.S. are legally binding regulations, whereas the TI’s 
Self-assessment questionnaire is a voluntary tool, without any formal obligations.  
The Conventions mainly address bribery, personal conflicts of interest, and 
competition issues; however, they do not address the creation of wasteful or unnecessary 
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requirements. Offsets are not included in their content. There is a lack of international 
agreement on offset agreements, and even if offsets are banned from trade agreements, 
there are exceptions for defense procurements in the case of national security or a 
country’s interests.  
The FCPA is an important regulation for defense procurements because of its 
broader scope; however facilitation payments constitute important vulnerabilities to 
corruption in defense procurement.  
The NATO-TI Building Integrity Self-Assessment is tailored for countries that are 
willing to assess their level of transparency, integrity and corruption risks in defense 
institutions. It offers a wide-range of questions to unveil the suspicious corners of the 
defense environment that set the grounds for corrupt acts. However, the NATO-TI Self-
Assessment is only a tool for assessment, and does not contain any legal binding; it 
cannot actually fix any of problems it reveals. Governments need to be willing to create 
legal frameworks to settle these problems. This is important because every country has 
specific sensitivities that should be addressed with tailor-made regulations 
B. CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of this research project was to investigate the corruption 
vulnerabilities in the defense procurement cycle and the existing international tools for 
rectifying these vulnerabilities.   
The conclusion of this research is that the tendering phase in the defense 
procurement cycle is the phase most prone to corruption vulnerabilities. The prominent 
vulnerabilities are the manipulation of competitive processes that encourages sole source 
tendering, and wasteful or unneeded offset arrangements that lack military value or 
public interest. In Chapters II and III, these matters were discussed. 
Through the analysis of  three international cases, it was found that offset 
arrangements can lack credible justifications; they can also be utilized as instruments in 
corruption schemes, used to influence the procurement process in favor of particular 
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bidders. Furthermore, sole source methods can allow bidders into the selection phase 
without the possession of contract requirements. 
Anti-corruption measures and tools are important, but the integrity of key decision 
makers is the most important factor that these measures to function properly. As 
discussed in the Druyun case, corrupt actions would not occur if government officials did 
not willfully and deliberately choose to follow the path of corruption. This situation leads 
to questions about the figures who oversee these officials? Cordova-Novion and 
Jacobzone mention that “without clear limits and accountability rules, an oversight body 
may be subject to the same criticism that justified its establishment:―who will watch the 
watchers, who will guard the guardians? That is, who will oversee the regulator of 
regulators” (2011)? 
An academic, sectoral analysis of corruption in the defense industry and defense 
procurement system does not exist, whereas health, education, construction, justice and 
other sectors, as well as overall public procurement system, are discussed and 
investigated by scholars like Campos and Pradhan (2007).  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study will present recommendations based on its conclusions: 
Defense procurement organizations and officials need to be aware of the highly 
susceptible areas in the defense procurement cycle, particularly the tendering phase. 
Auriol suggests the e-procurement method to increase the number of bidders in the 
tendering process and decrease procedural costs:  
E-procurement reduces substantially procurement procedural cost. The 
firms registered into the system receive automatically the tender offers. If 
they wish to submit an offer, they do it electronically from their office. 
Since more firms are informed of the tender, and since it is less costly for 
them to submit an offer, the number of bidders increases.  (Auriol, 2006, 
p. 875) 
Furthermore, caution should be exercised when making the decision to utilize the 
sole source method and offset arrangements. When using reducing competition, decision 
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makers should take the corruption risks associated with the sole source method into 
consideration. As discussed in the Chapter III, offset arrangements inherently possess 
risks of diverting economic and development goals, may have only a small amount of 
credible justification, and obscure monitoring and oversight processes. Offset 
arrangements require careful scrutiny. 
Taylor suggests several courses of action: 
First, procurement officers should conduct a benefit-cost estimate to 
determine whether the offset is superior to other instruments. For example, 
might bargaining for price discounts on the base good and then using these 
proceeds to purchase new technology on the open market be preferable   to 
the offset? Alternatively,   perhaps government could provide a subsidy to 
a targeted industry and foster   growth more effectively in the domestic 
economy compared to the offset. 
Second, when an offset is selected as an attachment to the transaction, the 
government should construct a well-defined contract. The contract should 
specify (a) a list of products and/or firms in the domestic economy that the 
seller can partner with to fulfill the offset obligation; (b) a schedule for 
fulfillment of various stages of the offset obligation; and (c) a penalty 
clause for non-compliance. Research has shown that such specification is 
desirable.’’ 
Third, governments should build databases to allow for formal accounting 
of the offset programs. Like other government policies, offsets involve 
massive amounts of public funds.   The performance of these funds ought 
to be accounted for by an offset audit team.  Then and only then, argues 
Brauer (2002, p. 13), can the “public-at-large decide whether the losses or 
profits are worth the original objective. (Taylor, 2003, p.352) 
This thesis suggests a micro level survey for defense procurement leaders that 







1. Single Sourcing: 
 What are the justifications for excluding competition in contracts? 
 Is there any analysis of the cons and pros of using a single source method 
while foregoing the positive effects of competition during the tendering 
phase? 
 Do any tendencies appear when the past contact awards are examined? 
Are any of the bidders repeatedly awarded on single source basis? 
2. Offsets: 
 What are the justifications for offset arrangements in the contract? 
 Were any analyses made for the costs and benefits of the proposed offset 
arrangements? If so, are goals and relevant milestones clearly set within 
the offset arrangements?  
 Did decision makers consider options such as applying subsidies to 
targeted domestic industries from the proceeds generated from the 
bargaining process, rather than using the offset option? 
 How will the monitoring and oversight efforts be applied during the 
implementation phase of offsets? 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
A specific, sectoral investigation could be conducted into the defense 
procurement process, in order to attempt to understand the extent of corruption in the 
process. Particularly, the scale and effect of single sourcing and offset arrangements 
could be quantified.  
Additionally, a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of current anti-
corruption tools can be conducted with a specific focus on defense procurement. 
Analyses on other sectors exist, ranging from health to education, but such an analysis of 
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